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This Article explores the problems arising from the use of the 
absolute assignment of rents in mortgage loan transactions, which 
have continued for over a century, as well as possible solutions.  Rents 
are a significant part of the security for loans secured by income-
producing properties such as office buildings, shopping centers, and 
apartments.  Under present law in many states, the absolute 
assignment of rents is the only means by which lenders can create an 
effective security interest in rents of mortgaged property.  An absolute 
assignment of rents purports to transfer title to rents to the mortgage 
lender although in substance it creates a security interest in rents.  
The Article explores the historical development of the absolute 
assignment of rents and discusses the confusion, unnecessary 
litigation, and even injustice that it causes under state law and in 
bankruptcy.  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws has recently approved the new Uniform Assignment of 
Rents Act, which removes the necessity for absolute assignments of 
rents by creating a workable and comprehensive scheme for the 
creation of security interests in rents.  The Article concludes by 
discussing the Act and recommending its adoption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For over one hundred years, the absolute assignment of rents in mortgage 
loan transactions has caused confusion, increased transaction costs, litigation, 
and in some cases injustice.  The absolute assignment of rents is a necessary evil 
in many states, however, because of the needs of mortgage lenders to create an 
effective security interest in rents of mortgaged property. 
When a loan is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on an income-
producing property such as an office building, shopping center, or apartment 
complex, rents are a significant part of the security for the loan in addition to the 
land and improvements.1 Rents provide the funds necessary to pay for operating 
and maintaining the mortgaged property and to make payments on the mortgage 
loan.  After a default on the mortgage loan, a borrower, facing the possibility of 
losing the property to foreclosure, may apply rents for purposes unrelated to the 
property or the mortgage loan.2 The lender, on the other hand, continues to want 
rents collected during the time period between default and foreclosure to be 
applied to operation, maintenance, and loan payments.  Therefore, a lender 
wants the ability to control rents from mortgaged property in the event of a 
default, and to this end will require the borrower at the time of the closing of the 
loan to execute an assignment of rents.3 Unfortunately, the law governing 
 
1See Julia Patterson Forrester, A Uniform and More Rational Approach to Rents as Security for the 
Mortgage Loan, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 349 (1993). 
2This practice is sometimes called "milking" the rents.  The borrower may spend rents to benefit 
other properties, to build a "war chest" of funds to pay attorneys’ fees for a bankruptcy filing or 
litigation against the lender, or for other purposes unrelated to the mortgaged property. 
3The assignment of rents or other loan documents may also contain restrictions on the ability of the 
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assignments of rents is illogical and confusing4 and varies significantly from 
state to state.5
Different types of assignments of rents have developed depending upon state 
law and the agreement reached between borrower and mortgage lender.  
Occasionally, lenders control rents from the time the loan is made, applying the 
rents first to loan payments and releasing the excess to the borrower to use for 
operating and maintaining the property.  Much more commonly, however, the 
parties agree that the borrower has the right to control rents until after default.  
One type of assignment of rents, called a collateral assignment of rents in this 
Article in order to distinguish it from an absolute assignment, creates one kind 
of security interest in rents.  With a collateral assignment of rents, the borrower 
has the right to collect rents until the lender, upon default, takes some 
affirmative action, depending on state law, such as taking possession of the 
mortgaged property, obtaining the appointment of a receiver, or making demand 
for rents on the borrower or tenants.6 In many states, a lender must take some 
burdensome action such as taking possession of the property in order to enforce 
an assignment of rents that is held to be a collateral assignment regardless of the 
agreement of the parties, and in some states a collateral assignment may be 
treated as unperfected until it is enforced.7 As a result, lenders prefer another 
type of assignment of rents, called an absolute assignment of rents, which 
purports to transfer title to rents to the lender effective upon default.  The 
absolute assignment provides that the borrower may collect rents until default, 
often based on a license from lender to borrower, but the lender’s right to collect 
rents accrues automatically and immediately upon the borrower’s default.8
In states that do not give meaningful effect to a collateral assignment of rents, 
 
borrower to enter into, modify, or terminate leases without the lender’s consent or to accept 
prepayments of rent, and tenants are often required to acknowledge the assignment of rents and the 
restrictions on modification and termination of leases and on prepayments of rent.  Loan documents 
may require that the borrower apply rents to pay expenses of operating and maintaining the 
property and to pay the mortgage debt.  When the loan is nonrecourse, the lender is particularly 
interested in the borrower’s use of rents, and the application of rents for purposes other than 
operation, maintenance, or payment of the loan may be an exception to the nonrecourse status of 
the loan. 
4Because of this confusion, the law governing assignments of rents in mortgage loan transactions 
has been the subject of numerous law review articles over the years.  See, e.g., Robert Abelow, An 
Historical Analysis of Assignments of Rents in New York, 6 BROOK. L. REV. 25 (1936); Morris 
Berick, The Mortgagee’s Right to Rents, 8 U. CIN. L. REV. 250 (1934); Forrester, supra note 1; R. 
Wilson Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents: The New Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, 71 
MO. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter The New UARA]; R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, 
Rents, and Formalism in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real 
Estate Finance, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (1993) [hereinafter Of Hotel Revenues]; Carlos L. Israels 
& Milton A. Kramer, The Significance of the Income Clause in a Corporate Mortgage, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 488, 488 (1930); Comment, The Mortgagee’s Right to Rents After Default, 50 YALE L. 
REV. 1424 (1941).  The focus of most of the articles published in the past twenty years has been the 
treatment of assignments of rents in bankruptcy.  See, e.g., Craig H. Averch et al., The Treatment of 
Net Rents in Bankruptcy – Adequate Protection, Payment of Interest, Return of Collateral, or 
Reduction of Debt, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 (1994); David Gray Carlson, Rents in Bankruptcy, 46 
S.C. L. REV. 1075 (1995); R. Wilson Freyermuth, The Circus Continues – Security Interest in 
Rents, Congress, the Bankruptcy Courts, and the “Rents Are Subsumed in the Land” Hypothesis, 6 
J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 115 (1997); James McCafferty, The Assignment of Rents in the Crucible of 
Bankruptcy, 94 COM. L.J. 516 (1988); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Recognizing Lenders’ Rents 
Interests in Bankruptcy, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 281 (1992); Glenn R. Schmitt, The 
Continuing Confusion Over Real Property Rents As Cash Collateral in Bankruptcy: The Need for a 
Consistent Interpretation, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 1 (1992-93). 
5See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. 
6See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
7See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
8See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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lenders obviously prefer an absolute assignment of rents, and borrowers are 
willing to execute absolute assignments of rents.  However, because many 
courts are hostile to finding an absolute assignment, lenders have had difficulty 
over the years creating an enforceable absolute assignment.  In many states, 
effective creation of an absolute assignment of rents requires the pretense of a 
transfer of title to rents that is not a security interest.9 This drafting challenge 
and the resulting litigation have continued for over a century.10
When courts do find an absolute assignment of rents, significant uncertainty 
exists over its effect.  Some courts hold that the absolute assignment is a transfer 
of title to the rents, while others hold that it creates a security interest, albeit a 
different type of security interest from that created by a collateral assignment of 
rents.11 This confusion has played out to some extent in state courts, but to a 
greater extent in bankruptcy courts after the borrower files a petition in 
bankruptcy.  Therefore, although state law governs assignments of rents, federal 
courts frequently determine the current state of the law in the various 
jurisdictions. 
In this Article, I address the confusion over the absolute assignment of rents, 
the unnecessary litigation and the injustice caused by this disorder, and possible 
solutions to the problem.12 Part I discusses the legal theories underlying the 
creation of a security interest in rents.  In Part II, I explain the problems that 
have caused lenders to prefer absolute assignments over collateral assignments, 
including problems relating to perfection, enforcement, and access to rents 
collected by the borrower after default, and in Part III, I explore the 
development of absolute assignments of rents from the late nineteenth century 
into the twentieth century. 
Part IV discusses the disarray caused by absolute assignments of rents, 
including the challenge that lenders face in creating one, the varying treatment 
of absolute assignments by state and federal courts, and the problems caused by 
absolute assignments under state law and in bankruptcy.  Part IV also discusses 
how the absolute assignment of rents should be treated.  Despite its form, an 
absolute assignment of rents in a mortgage loan transaction in substance creates 
a security interest.  Finally, Part IV provides analogies to other areas of the law 
in which courts have more successfully determined the substance of a security 
transaction despite its form. 
In Part V, I examine possible solutions.  One solution is judicial–courts could 
 
9See infra Part IV.B. 
10In 1894 the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a lender’s assignment of rents was not an 
absolute assignment because of language in the assignment that it was given “as additional security 
for the payment of . . . notes.” Armour Packing Co. v. Wolff & Co., 59 Mo. App. 665 (1894).  In 
2001, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that a lender’s assignment 
of rents was not an absolute assignment despite language in the document that the borrower 
“absolutely and unconditionally” assigned the rents.  In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268 B.R. 140, 146-47 
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001).  Numerous courts in the years between also addressed the issue of 
whether an assignment of rents is absolute.  See infra Part IV.B. for a discussion of these cases. 
11See infra Part IV.A. 
12This is not my first attempt at proposing a solution.  In an article published in 1993, I examined 
the problems of using rents as security for a mortgage loan and proposed that security interests in 
rents should be covered by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Forrester, supra note 1, 
at 402.  Independently, but at the same time, Professor Wilson Freyermuth reached the same 
conclusion.  See Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, supra note 4, at 1467.  Some of the members of 
the PEB Study Group’s Advisory Group on Real Estate-Related Collateral recommended that rents 
be covered by Article 9, AM. LAW INST. AND NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFROM STATE 
LAWS, REPORT OF THE PEB STUDY GROUP ON ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
app. 154-55, 196 (1992), but rents were ultimately excluded from Article 9, U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(11) 
(2001). 
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adopt an approach of the Restatement of Property–Mortgages that makes the 
charade of the absolute assignment of rents unnecessary.  However, after more 
than one hundred years of disarray, this change is unlikely to occur quickly.  A 
more appropriate solution is a legislative one–adoption of the new Uniform 
Assignment of Rents Act (“UARA”),13 which also removes the necessity for 
absolute assignments of rents and at the same time clarifies and simplifies the 
law relating to assignments of rents.  Part V also discusses the scheme adopted 
by UARA to handle the complex issues raised by assignments of rents in 
mortgage loan transactions.14 
The absolute assignment of rents has created havoc in commercial real estate 
loans for too long.  More than a century of confusion, unnecessary litigation, and 
injustice is enough.  With UARA now recommended for enactment, a good 
solution is in the wings, and state legislatures should adopt it. 
I.  THE NATURE OF RENTS AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN RENTS 
The right to unaccrued rents from real property is an “incorporeal 
hereditament”– an interest in land incident to the landlord’s reversion.15 The 
right to collect rents is part of the bundle of property rights covered by a 
mortgage of the real property to which they relate, therefore, a foreclosure sale 
purchaser is entitled to rents accruing after the date of foreclosure from leases 
that remain in effect after the foreclosure.16 In most states, however, in the 
absence of an assignment of rents, the borrower has the right to collect rents 
until the lender takes possession of the property as a mortgagee in possession or 
after foreclosure or until a receiver takes possession of the property.17 
13The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Sate Laws (NCCUSL) appointed a 
drafting committee in 2003 to prepare a Uniform Assignment of Rents Act at the urging of the Joint 
Editorial Board for Real Property Acts.  See Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 4, at 3.  
NCCUSL approved UARA and recommended it for enactment in all states in July 2005.  UNIFORM 
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT (2005). 
14A full discussion of all of the provisions of the UARA is outside the scope of this Article.  For 
such a discussion, see Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 4. 
15See Norwest Bank v. Superior Court, 963 P.2d 319, 323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); Winnisimmet 
Trust Inc. v. Libby, 122 N.E. 575, 576 (Mass. 1919); First & Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Sawyer, 10 
S.E.2d 656, 658 (N.C. 1940); Marine Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co., 454 
A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Schmid v. Baum's Home of Flowers, 37 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 
1931).  Blackstone listed rents among the ten principal incorporeal hereditaments.  2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20. 
Jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether rents are severed from the real property when they 
accrue, White v. Irvine, 22 S.W.2d 778, 778 (Mo. 1929); Marine Nat'l Bank, 454 A.2d at 70, or 
when they are collected, In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
1990), aff'd sub nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 985 
F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993); Treetop Apartments Gen. Partnership v. Oyster, 800 S.W.2d 628, 629 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
A severence also occurs when the right to unaccrued rents is assigned to a third party, Brack v. 
Coburn, 196 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Ark. 1946), Valley Nat'l Bank v. Avco Dev. Co., 480 P.2d 671, 674 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); Winnisimmet, 122 N.E. at 576; Schmid, 37 S.W.2d at 108, reserved in a 
transfer of the landlord’s reversion, Jim Davis & Co. v. Albuquerque Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc., 
536 So. 2d 55, 58 (Ala. 1988) (quoting Walsh v. Bank of Moundville, 132 So. 52, 53 (Ala. 1930)); 
Brack, 196 S.W.2d at 234; Winnisimmet, 122 N.E. at 576; Tinnon v. Tanksley, 408 S.W.2d 98, 105 
(Mo. 1966), or pledged as security for a loan apart from the land, Treetop, 800 S.W.2d at 629 
(citing Standridge v. Vines, 81 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)). 
16See Jim Davis & Co., 536 So. 2d at 58 (quoting Walsh, 132 So. at 53); Norwest Bank, 963 P.2d at 
323-25; Security Sav. & Loan Soc. v. Dudley, 26 P.2d 384, 385 (Wash. 1933). 
17See Teal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 242, 248 (1884); Simpson v. Ferguson, 44 P. 484, 485 (Cal. 1896); 
Bornstein v. Somerson, 341 So. 2d 1043, 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Mid-Continent Supply 
Co. v. Hauser, 269 P.2d 453, 458 (Kan. 1954); Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Mercantile Club, 241 S.W. 
923, 927 (Mo. 1922); Wyckoff v. Scofield, 98 N.Y. 475, 477 (1885); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Begin, 16 N.E.2d 1015, 1016 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938); Treetop, 800 S.W.2d at 629.  In title and 
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Because the foreclosure process is lengthy in many states,18 a significant 
time period may elapse between the borrower’s default and completion of a 
foreclosure sale.  During that period, a lender may wish to exercise provisional 
remedies such as securing the appointment of a receiver for the property, taking 
possession of the property, or collecting rents from the property.  The extent to 
which these provisional remedies are available depends upon the law of the state 
where the mortgaged property is located and the effect given in that state to the 
mortgage instrument itself. 
The traditional but now minority view of the effect of a mortgage is the title 
theory  which treats a mortgage as a transfer of title to the property to the 
lender.19 In title theory states the lender theoretically has the right upon the 
borrower’s execution of the mortgage to take possession of the mortgaged 
property and collect the rents therefrom.20 Most states are lien theory states in 
which a mortgage lender is treated as having only a lien on the mortgaged 
property and the borrower retains the right to possession and rents until 
completion of foreclosure.21 Finally, in a few states, called intermediate states, a 
mortgage lender has a hybrid interest which gives the lender the right to take 
possession of the property and collect rents after the borrower’s default.22 
As a practical matter the differences between title, lien, and intermediate 
theory states may not be so great as they would first appear.  In many lien theory 
states a lender has the right to take possession of the property and collect rents 
after default if the mortgage has a provision to that effect.23 In title theory states 
a borrower and lender will generally agree to permit the borrower to remain in 
possession of the property at least until default.24 Therefore, borrowers and 
lenders adopt by contract the treatment of the intermediate theory states in title 
theory states and in those lien theory states in which it is permissible, giving the 
lender the right to take possession of the property and to begin collecting rents 
upon default. 
In most states, therefore, a lender may collect rents upon default by taking 
possession of the mortgaged property.  Rents collected by a lender in possession 
of mortgaged property must be applied to pay expenses of operating and 
 
intermediate theory states, discussed infra at notes 19-24, a lender may collect rents from tenants 
whose leases are senior to the mortgage after default and demand upon the tenant even without an 
assignment of rents.  See Robert Kratovil, Mortgages--Problems in Possession, Rents, and 
Mortgagee Liability, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 8 (1961). 
18See NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.1 (2001); ABA Report of Committee 
on Mortgage Law & Practice, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP., 
PROB. & TR. J. 413, 414 (1968).  See also Sidney A. Keyles, FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED 
REMEDIES: A STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST (1995) (describing the foreclosure process in each of the 
fifty states).  A number of states give the borrower a statutory right of redemption for a period 
which begins after foreclosure, and in these states it is only after the statutory redemption period 
has expired that the borrower's rights in the property are extinguished.  See NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra § 8.4. 
19See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 4.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY 
(MORTGAGES) § 4.1 cmt. a (1997); Kratovil, supra note 17, at 4. 
20See Kratovil, supra note 17, at 5. 
21Id. at 4, 6.  In some states the borrower’s right of possession is extended until the expiration of a 
statutory redemption period.  Id.
22Id. at 4-5.  See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 4.1-4.3. 
23See Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d 450, 452 (Cal. 1941); Topeka Sav. Ass'n v. 
Beck, 428 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1967); Central Sav. Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 181 N.W.2d 261, 
264 (Neb. 1970); Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248 P. 481, 483 (Utah 1926). 
24Massachusetts is a title theory state, J & W Wall Systems, Inc. v. Shawmut First Bank & Trust 
Co., 594 N.E.2d 859, 860 n.3 (Mass. 1992), but the borrower has a statutory right to remain in 
possession until default in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.   See MASS. ANN. L. ch. 
183, § 26 (Law. Co-op. 1996). 
58010-TEXT.NATIVE.1160168319 10/9/2006 10:08:04 AM
Still Crazy After All These Years 107 
maintaining the property and to the payment of the indebtedness secured by the 
mortgage.25 Even if the lender is not permitted to take possession of the 
mortgaged property, the lender has the right to the appointment of a receiver for 
the property upon making the required showing to a court of the necessity for a 
receiver.26 The remedies of possession by a lender or receivership are necessary 
for a lender if the borrower is wasting or mismanaging the mortgaged property.  
However, lenders usually want the ability upon a default to control rents without 
taking possession of the property or obtaining the appointment of a receiver,27 
and lenders therefore typically require the execution by the borrower of an 
assignment of rents in an attempt to make this remedy available. 
Assignments of rents are recognized as valid and enforceable in every 
jurisdiction regardless of the mortgage theory that the jurisdiction has adopted, 
but they receive widely varying treatment in different jurisdictions.28 States 
vary in the steps required for perfection of a collateral assignment of rents, 29 
and in the methods permitted for enforcement.30 Most states recognize and give 
effect to an absolute assignment of rents,31 but some states do not recognize the 
absolute assignment of rents or treat it no differently from a collateral 
assignment of rents.32 In many states, a collateral assignment of rents will not 
accomplish the lender’s objectives because of problems relating to perfection, 
enforcement, and the lender’s access to collected rents.33 As a result, lenders 
often require the borrower to give an absolute assignment of rents. 
II.  DEFICIENCIES OF THE COLLATERAL ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
A. THE PERFECTION PROBLEM 
The issues that arise with respect to perfection of a security interest in rents 
are best understood by first examining perfection of other types of security 
 
25See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 4.27. 
26See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
27For a discussion of the disadvantages to a lender of the mortgagee in possession and receivership 
remedies, see Part II.B. 
28NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 4.35. 
29See infra Part II.A. 
30See infra Part II.B. 
31See, e.g., FDIC v. Int'l Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying 
Texas law); Matter of Charles D. Stapp of Nevada, Inc., 641 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying 
Nevada law); Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (In re O'Neill Enterprises, Inc.), 506 F.2d 
1242 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying Virginia law); First Fidelity Bank v. Eleven Hundred Metroplex 
Assocs., 190 B.R. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); First Fed. Sav. v. City Nat’l Bank, 87 B.R. 565 (W.D. Ark. 
1988); In re Kingsport Ventures, L.P., 251 B.R. 841 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (citing American 
Trust & Banking Co. V. Twinam, 216 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1948)); In re Robin Associates, 275 
B.R. 218 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); In re Carter, 126 B.R. 811 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re 
Galvin, 120 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990); In re Gould, 78 B.R. 590 (D. Idaho 1987); In re P.M.G. 
Properties, 55 B.R. 864 (E.D. Mich. 1985); HomeCorp v. Secor Bank, 659 So.2d 15 (Ala. 1995); 
Vector Realty Group v. 711 Fourteenth St., Inc., 711 A.2d 1265, 1267 (D.C. 1998); Hawaii 
National Bank v. Cook, 58 P.3d 60 (Hawaii 2002); Metlife Capital Fin. Corp. V. Wash. Ave 
Assocs. L.P., 732 A.2d 493, 503 (N.J. 1999); 801 Nolana, Inc. v. RTC Mortgage Trust 1994-S6, 
994 S.W.2d 751(Tex. App. 1997). 
In some states the absolute assignment is treated as creating a security interest, albeit a different 
type of security interest from a collateral assignment, and other courts state at least that an absolute 
assignment of rents is a transfer to the lender of the borrower’s interest in the rents.  See infra Part 
IV.A. 
32See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(a) (West Supp. 2006); In re Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 
937 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1991) (Wisconsin law); Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank (In re Kurth 
Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990). 
33See infra Part II. 
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interests.  Security interests in personal property become effective between the 
parties upon creation, but must be perfected if the secured party is to have 
“maximum . . . protection against third parties, including the trustee in 
bankruptcy.”34 Under Article 9 of the UCC, the method of perfection is 
determined by the type of collateral, but the more common means of perfection 
include filing a financing statement or taking possession of the collateral.35 
Both filing and possession give notice of the security interest. 
The term “perfection” is not typically used with respect to security interests in 
real property, but comparable concepts exist.  A creditor with a lien on real 
property gets maximum protection against third parties and obtains priority over 
other creditors by recording the lien in the real property records.  Recordation in 
the context of real property, like perfection in the context of Article 9, is a step 
that is designed to give notice to third parties of the creditor’s interest in the 
property. 
Perfection of assignments of rents has caused a great deal of confusion.  
Under the traditional common law approach, a collateral assignment of rents 
creates what is called an “inchoate” lien36 that is not perfected until the lender 
takes whatever action is required to enforce the assignment of rents.37 Several 
states38 and a number of federal courts interpreting state law39 still follow this 
approach.  To make matters worse for lenders, states that follow the common 
law approach to perfection may also require burdensome action for 
enforcement.40 Therefore, the lender does not have a perfected security interest 
in rents until the lender takes possession of the property or takes some similar 
action.41 Typical of this troublesome approach is Taylor v. Brennan in which 
the Texas Supreme Court held that a collateral assignment of rents is inchoate 
and “does not become effective until the mortgagee obtains possession of the 
property, or impounds the rents, or secures the appointment of a receiver, or 
takes some other similar action.”42 
Most states by statute43 or judicial decision44 have now adopted a modern 
 
34JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §31-1 (5th ed. 2002). 
35Id. § 31-4. 
36"Inchoate" means "[p]artially completed or imperfectly formed; just begun."  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 776 (8th ed. 2004). 
37O’Neal Steel, Inc. v. E B Inc. (In re Millette), 186 F.3d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1999). 
38See Bevins v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 671 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1983); Martinez v. 
Continental Enter., 730 P.2d 308, 316 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 
594 (Tex. 1981). 
39See Millette, 186 F.3d at 641 n.6 (citing In re Century Inv. Fund VIII L.P., 937 F.2d 371, 377 (7th 
Cir.1991) (Wisconsin law); In re 1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs., 126 B.R. 1, 3 (D.D.C.1991) (District of 
Columbia law); First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. of Toledo v. Hunter (In re Sam A. Tisci, 
Inc.), 133 B.R. 857, 859 (N.D.Ohio 1991) (Ohio law); Condor One, Inc. v. Turtle Creek, Ltd. (In re 
Turtle Creek, Ltd.), 194 B.R. 267, 278 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1996) (Alabama law); In re Mews Assocs., 
L.P., 144 B.R. 867, 868-69 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1992) (Missouri law);  Drummond v. Farm Credit 
Bank of Spokane (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr.D.Mont.1990) (Montana law); 
Armstrong v. United States (In re Neideffer), 96 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr.D.N.D.1988) (North Dakota 
law); Ziegler v. First Nat'l Bank of Volga (In re Ziegler), 65 B.R. 285, 287 (Bankr.D.S.D.1986) 
(South Dakota law)).  But cf. Vienna Park Properties v. United Postal Savings Ass'n (In re Vienna 
Park Properties), 976 F.2d 106, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding security interest in rents was 
inchoate under Virginia law but nevertheless perfected); In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 
850, 855 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re 
Park at Dash Point L.P.), 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding security interest inchoate but 
perfected). 
40See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of permitted methods of enforcement. 
41See Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981). 
42Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594. 
43See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(b) (West Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2121(a) 
(2004); FLA. STAT. § 697.07 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2343(b) (West 2005); MD. CODE 
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approach to perfection of an assignment of rents–that perfection is accomplished 
by recordation.  Perfection in these states, therefore, is analogous to perfection 
under Article 9 of the UCC and perfection of a mortgage lien.  Filing a financing 
statement or recording an instrument in the real property records is the step by a 
lender that gives notice to the world of the security interest or lien.  Similarly, 
recording an assignment of rents in the real property records gives notice of the 
security interest in rents and thus perfects the security interest. 
Nevertheless, in a significant minority of states, a recorded collateral 
assignment of rents is not treated as perfected until the lender takes steps to 
enforce the security interest.45 As a result, in a priority contest between a 
mortgage lender with a recorded but unenforced assignment of rents and a 
judgment lien creditor who has served a writ of garnishment on rents, the 
judgment lien creditor will win.46 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in 
criticizing the common law approach stated: “This leads to a bizarre result: A 
mortgagee, which has done all it could to secure its interest in the rents, loses 
priority to a judgment creditor who had constructive knowledge by the 
recordation of the mortgagee’s assignment of rents.”47 This result defeats the 
public policy concerns underlying recording acts.48 
Before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,49 the confusion over perfection 
of assignments of rents created havoc in the bankruptcy courts.50 The 
Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee in bankruptcy, as well as a debtor in 
possession, the power to avoid transfers to the same extent as a bona fide 
purchaser of real property from the debtor or a lien creditor of the debtor.51 
Therefore, the trustee or debtor in possession can avoid an unrecorded transfer 
of an interest in real property or an unperfected security interest.  In bankruptcy 
cases, courts look to state law to determine the extent of property rights, 
 
ANN., REAL PROP. § 3-204 (LexisNexis 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-1704 (2004); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 47- 20(c) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116(a) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 
(2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.28.230(3) (West Supp. 2006). 
44See Millette, 186 F.3d at 642 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Blue Island, 621 
N.E.2d 209, 214-15 (Ill.App.Ct.1993); Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Oklahoma 
Tower Assocs. L.P., 798 P.2d 618, 622 (Okla.1990)). 
A number of federal courts have interpreted state law as opting for the modern approach to 
perfection of an assignment of rents.  See Millette, 186 F.3d at 642 n.7 (citing Commerce Bank v. 
Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 39 (3d Cir.1993) (Pennsylvania law); Scottsdale Med. 
Pavilion v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (In re Scottsdale Med. Pavilion), 52 F.3d 244 (9th 
Cir.1995), adopting as its own opinion, 159 B.R. 295, 302 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) (Arizona law); In re 
Sansone, 126 B.R. 16, 19 (Bankr. D. Conn.1991) (Connecticut law);  In re May, 169 B.R. 462, 467 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga.1994) (Georgia law); Federal Land Bank v. Terpstra (In re Porter), 90 B.R. 399, 
404 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (Iowa law);  First Nat'l Bank of Bar Harbor v. United States Dep't of Agric. 
(In re Dorsey), 155 B.R. 263, 268 (Bankr. D. Me.1993) (Maine law); In re Coventry Commons 
Assocs., 143 B.R. 837, 838 (E.D. Mich.1992) (Michigan law); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bremer 
Towers, 714 F.Supp. 414, 418 (D. Minn.1989) (Minnesota law); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Sourlis, 
141 B.R. 826, 834 (D.N.J.1992) (New Jersey law);  641 Avenue of the Americas, L.P. v. 641 
Assocs., Ltd., 189 B.R. 583, 590 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (New York law); In re KNM Roswell L.P., 126 
B.R. 548, 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.1991) (New Mexico law); SLC Ltd. V v. Bradford Group West, Inc. 
(In re SLC Ltd. V), 152 B.R. 755, 761 (Bankr. D. Utah 1993) (Utah law)).  See also Vienna Park 
Properties v. United Postal Savings Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Properties), 976 F.2d 106, 112-13 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (security interest in rents was inchoate under Virginia law but still perfected) 
45See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
46See Millette, 186 F.3d at 642. 
47Id.
48See id.
49Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) 
50See Forrester, supra note 1, at 354-55 n.21 (“The author found more than 300 cases reported from 
1980 to [1993] involving the issue of rents.”) 
51See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2004). 
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including a mortgage lender’s rights to rents.52 Thus, depending on state law or 
a federal court’s interpretation of state law, courts in bankruptcy cases had 
adopted different approaches to the issue of whether the trustee or debtor in 
possession could avoid a mortgage lender’s assignment of rents that was 
recorded but not yet enforced.53 Some courts determined that the trustee could 
avoid the lender’s interest in rents if state law required enforcement for 
perfection.54 Other courts permitted the lender to perfect the assignment of rents 
by filing a notice in the bankruptcy court even if it was treated as unperfected 
under state law before the bankruptcy filing.55 A third group of courts found a 
properly recorded assignment of rents was perfected and thus would not permit 
the trustee to avoid the lender’s interest in rents.56
Congress addressed this issue in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 199457 by 
amending section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.58 According to legislative 
 
52See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).  In Butner, the United States Supreme 
Court said: 
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest 
requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed 
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy 
proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts 
within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to 
prevent a party from receiving "a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of 
bankruptcy." Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 . . . . The 
justifications for application of state law are not limited to ownership interests; they 
apply with equal force to security interests, including the interest of a mortgagee in 
rents earned by mortgaged property. 
Id. at 55.  The Court has continued to follow its mandate set forth Butner under the current 
Bankruptcy Code.  See Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 16 (2000); Nobelman v. 
American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 324 (1993). 
53See Forrester, supra note 1, at 386-92. 
54See, e.g., Glessner v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Glessner), 140 B.R. 556 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 1992), overruled by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2343 (West 2003); Drummond v. Farm Credit 
Bank (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In re Multi-Group III Ltd. 
Partnership, 99 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91 B.R. 349 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Ass'n Center Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
1988), overruled by WASH. REV. CODE § 7.28.230(3) (West Supp. 2006); In re Hamlin's Landing 
Joint Venture, 77 B.R. 916 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1987), overruled by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West 
2006); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Gotta (In re Gotta), 47 B.R. 198 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985). 
55See, e.g., Casbeer v. State Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Casbeer), 793 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Properties, Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); Consol. Capital Income Trust v. Colter, Inc. (In re Consol. 
Capital Income Trust), 47 B.R. 1008 (D. Colo. 1985); McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v. First Texas 
Sav. Ass'n (In re McCombs Properties VI, Ltd.), 88 B.R. 261 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); In re Mears, 
88 B.R. 419 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Gelwicks, 81 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); FDIC v. 
Lancaster (In re Sampson), 57 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); United States v. Farrell (In re 
Fluge), 57 B.R. 451 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985). 
56See, e.g., Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 985 F.2d 1008 
(9th Cir. 1993); Vienna Park Properties v. United Postal Savings Ass'n (In re Vienna Park 
Properties), 976 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1992); J.H. Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co. (In re SeSide Co.), 152 
B.R. 878 (E.D. Pa. 1993); In re Northport Marina Assocs., 136 B.R. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re 
White Plains Development Corp., 136 B.R. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Raleigh/Spring Forest 
Apartments Assocs., 118 B.R. 42 (E.D.N.C. 1990); Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Metro 
Square (In re Metro Square), 106 B.R. 584 (D. Minn. 1989); In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 1991); In re Somero, 122 B.R. 634 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991). 
57Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) 
5811 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2004).  Section 552(b)(2) now reads: 
Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547, and 548 of this title, 
and notwithstanding section 546(b) of this title, if the debtor and an entity entered 
into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and if the security 
interest created by such security agreement extends to property of the debtor 
acquired before the commencement of the case and to amounts paid as rents of such 
property or the fees, charges, accounts, or other payments for the use or occupancy 
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history of the Act, the amendment “provides that lenders may have valid 
security interests in post petition rents for bankruptcy purposes notwithstanding 
their failure to have fully perfected their security interest under applicable state 
law.”59 Thus, according to this legislative history, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor 
in possession should no longer be able to avoid properly recorded assignments 
of rents.  Some commentators have disputed the effectiveness of the language of 
the current § 522(b)(2) to resolve the perfection problem in bankruptcy,60 but the 
spate of litigation over this issue has subsided. 
Under state law in a number of states, the perfection problem for a collateral 
assignment of rents persists.  A solution, however, that lenders have found to the 
perfection problem is the absolute assignment of rents. An absolute assignment 
does not create an inchoate lien on rents and is effective upon default.61
Therefore, even in those states that have equated perfection with enforcement 
for a collateral assignment of rents, courts have held that an absolute assignment 
does not require additional action by the lender in order to be perfected.62 
Therefore, lenders have an incentive to require an absolute assignment of rents 
rather than a collateral assignment in those states that retain the traditional 
common law approach to perfection.  In other states, issues over enforcement 
may create that incentive. 
B. THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM 
The method by which a collateral assignment of rents may be enforced varies 
from state to state.  In some states a lender may enforce a collateral assignment 
of rents by taking some nominal action such as making demand on the 
borrower63 or the tenants.64 Other states may require somewhat more onerous 
action such as filing a request for a receiver,65 or initiating a foreclosure 
proceeding.66 To enforce a collateral assignment of rents in many states, 
however, the lender must take possession of the mortgaged property or take 
some action, such as obtaining the appointment of a receiver, that is considered 
the equivalent of taking possession of the property.67 
of rooms and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties, 
then such security interest extends to such rents and such fees, charges, accounts, or 
other payments acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the 
extent provided in such security agreement, except to any extent that the court, after 
notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise. 
Id. The Act deleted “and by applicable non-bankruptcy law” after “security agreement” and added 
“and notwithstanding section 546(b) of this title” as shown above.  Pub. L. No. 103-394, §214(a), 
108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (1994) (codified in 11 U.S.C. §552(b)). 
59140 CONG. REC. 27,678, 27,695 (1994) (statement of Rep. Brooks). 
60See Carlson, supra note 4, at 1145; Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 4, at 28; Marvin E. 
Jacob et al, An Analysis of the Provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Relating to Cases 
Administered Under Chapter 11, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC 339, 370-73 (1995). 
61See Millette, 186 F.3d at 643. 
62See id.; In re Geary's Bottled Liquors Co., Inc.,184 B.R. 408 (Bankr. D.Mass. 1995). 
63See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(c)(4) (West 2006); United States v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 
451, 454 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Bevins v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 671 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 
1983); Hawaii Nat’l Bank v. Cook, 58 P.3d 60, 67-68 (Haw. 2002). 
64See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(c)(3); Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Northwest Commons, 
Inc. (In re Northwest Commons), 136 B.R. 215, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991), criticized in In re 
Mews Assocs., 144 B.R. 867 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Fluge, 57 B.R. at 454; Hawaii Nat’l Bank, 
58 P.3d at 67-68. 
65See, e.g., In re Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 937 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1991); In re 
Flower City Nursing Home, Inc., 38 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984). 
66See Martinez v. Continental Enterprises, 730 P.2d 308, 316 (Colo. 1986). 
67See Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co. v. Shepard, 127 U.S. 494, 502-03 (1888) (requiring that the 
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Requiring that a lender take possession of mortgaged property or obtain the 
appointment of a receiver in order to enforce a collateral assignment of rents is a 
significant disadvantage to lenders.  A lender must go to court to obtain the 
appointment of a receiver, and, unless the borrower is willing to relinquish 
possession of the property voluntarily, obtaining possession of the mortgaged 
property requires judicial intervention as well.68 The delay can give a borrower 
time to collect and misapply rents.69 In addition, when a lender becomes a 
mortgagee in possession, the lender faces potential liability that can exceed the 
amount of the mortgage debt.  First, a lender in possession can have liability for 
environmental problems on the property.70 Second, the lender can be held liable 
to the borrower for mismanagement if the lender fails “to manage the property 
in a reasonably prudent and careful manner so as to keep it in a good state of 
preservation and productivity.”71 A mortgagee in possession is held to the 
standard of a “prudent” or “provident” owner.72 Finally, the lender may have 
liability to third parties for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on the 
property.73 For these reasons lenders are generally hesitant to become 
mortgagees in possession.74 
lender take actual possession, that a receiver take possession, or that the lender's demand for 
possession be refused); In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 856 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990) 
(requiring the lender to obtain possession either directly or through a receiver), aff'd sub nom.
Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 
1993); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981) (requiring the lender to obtain 
possession, impound the rents, secure appointment of a receiver, or take some similar action). 
68Obtaining the appointment of a receiver requires a court order, and although the mortgagee in 
possession remedy is designed to take effect without judicial intervention, a lender may not use 
force to dispossess a borrower who refuses to give up possession of the mortgaged property. 
69A lender with a collateral assignment of rents cannot reach rents collected by the borrower during 
this period.  See infra Part II.C. 
70The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601-9657 (2005) [hereinafter CERCLA], imposes liability upon owners and operators of 
hazardous waste sites.  Id. § 9607(a).  "Owner or operator" does not include "a lender that, without 
participating in the management of a . . . facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect the 
security interest . . . in the . . . facility."  Id. § 9601(20)(E).  CERCLA defines participation in 
management as "actually participating in the management or operational affairs of a . . . facility" 
and “does not include merely having the capacity to influence, or the unexercised right to control . . 
. facility operations.”  Id. § 9601(20)(F).  The statute includes within the meaning of the term the 
exercise of "decision-making control over the environmental compliance related to the . . . facility" 
or the exercise of "control at a level comparable to that of a manager of the . . . facility" if the 
borrower remains in possession of the facility.  Id. Therefore, a lender's exercise of such control 
while in possession of the facility is probably within the scope of "participation in management." 
The statute provides a safe harbor for a lender after foreclosure if the lender is attempting to sell 
the property as prescribed by the statute, id. § 9601(20)(F), but the rule provides no similar safe 
harbor for a lender in possession prior to foreclosure.  Therefore, a mortgagee in possession is 
likely participating in the management of a facility and does not fit within the exemption from 
liability. 
71Myers-Macomber Engineers v. M.L.W. Constr. Corp., 414 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). 
72See also Whitley v. Barnett, 131 N.W. 704, 705 (Iowa 1911); United Nat’l Bank v. Parish, 750 
A.2d 238, 241 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999); Koury v. Sood, 62 A.2d 649, 653 (R.I. 1948); Bomar v. 
Smith, 195 S.W. 964, 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Coleman v. Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY–MORTGAGES, § 4.1 cmt. c (1997). 
73See Daniels v. Hart, 118 Mass. 543, 544 (1875); Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N.H. 9, 34 (1869); First 
Nat’l Bank v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 708 A.2d 69, 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); 
Rogers v. Wheeler, 2 Lans. 486, 489 (N.Y. 1870), aff'd 43 N.Y. 598 (1870); Zisman v. City of 
Duquesne, 18 A.2d 95, 97 (Pa. Super. 1941); Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421 (1857); Coleman, 64 
P.3d at 68; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 4.26. 
74Even in states that permit enforcement of a collateral assignment of rents by less onerous action 
than taking possession, courts may consider the required action to be the equivalent of taking 
possession.  See J.H. Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co. (In re SeSide Co.), 152 B.R. 878, 883 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (classifying a lender's service of demand notices on tenants as taking constructive 
possession); Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Northwest Commons, Inc. (In re Northwest 
Commons), 136 B.R. 215, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (finding that lender's giving of notices to 
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There are also disadvantages to the receivership remedy.  First, a lender may 
find it difficult to make the necessary showing to a court that a receiver should 
be appointed.  In many states the insolvency of the borrower and inadequacy of 
the security are not by themselves sufficient to cause a court to appoint a 
receiver.  Some additional equitable ground for the receivership “such as danger 
of loss, waste, destruction, or serious impairment of the property” must exist.75 
The effectiveness of a provision in loan documents that a lender is entitled to the 
appointment of a receiver varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.76 If the lender 
does procure the appointment of a receiver, fees paid to the receiver reduce 
funds available for payment of the mortgage debt and a risk exists that the 
receiver will mismanage the property.  Finally, in states that permit non-judicial 
foreclosure, a lender risks being deemed to have elected a judicial foreclosure by 
going to court to obtain the appointment of a receiver.77 Therefore, receivership 
may be undesirable to lenders as a means to control rents. 
The absolute assignment of rents has provided a solution for lenders to the 
enforcement problem for collateral assignments of rents.  An absolute 
assignment of rents gives the lender the right to collect rents automatically upon 
default.78 Therefore, the lender can take control of rents upon default without 
taking any burdensome action. 
 
tenants was equivalent to taking possession), criticized in In re Mews Assocs., 144 B.R. 867 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Spiotta v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 168 A. 159, 160 (N.J. Hudson County Ct. 
1933) (finding constructive possession where lender had served notice on tenant demanding 
payment of rent to lender).  As a result, the lender could be treated as a mortgagee in possession 
with the attendant risks and liabilities.  See United Nat’l Bank v. Parish, 750 A.2d 238 (N.J. Super. 
1999) (treating a lender who collected rents pursuant to an assignment of rents as a mortgagee in 
possession).  However, most courts have held that simply collecting rents after making demand on 
the borrower or tenants without otherwise taking control of the property does not make a lender a 
mortgagee in possession.  See Prince v. Brown, 856 P.2d 589, 590 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993); 
Coleman v. Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65, 69-70 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 
18, § 4.25.  See also Strutt v. Ontario Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Cal. Rptr. 395, 405 (1973) (finding 
that a lender "who, after default, does no more than collect rents by means of a letter request to the 
tenants and who does not undertake management of the property is [not] a 'mortgagee in 
possession'"); Luther P. Stephens Inv. Co. v. Berry Schools, 3 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Ga. 1939) ("[T]he 
mere fact that the mortgagee receives the rents and profits does not constitute him a mortgagee in 
possession, unless he takes the rent in such a way as to take out of the hands of the mortgagor the 
management and control of the estate.”); Ireland v. U.S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 76 N.Y.S. 177 
(1902) (finding that a lender’s receipt of rents does not make the lender a mortgagee in possession), 
aff'd 67 N.E. 1083 (1902). 
75Grether v. Nick, 213 N.W. 304, 306, aff'd on reh'g, 215 N.W. 571 (Wis. 1927).  See also Totten v. 
Harlowe, 90 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 711 (1937); Atco Constr. & Dev. 
Corp. v. Beneficial Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 523 So. 2d 747 (Fla. App. 1988); First Nat'l Bank v. Illinois 
Steel Co., 51 N.E. 200, 204 (Ill. 1898); Crowley v. Valley W. Water Co., 882 P.2d 1022, 1026 
(Mont. 1994); Cortelyeu v. Hathaway, 11 N.J. Eq. 39, 43 (1855).  See generally NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 4.34. 
76The presence of a receivership clause in the mortgage has virtually no effect in some states.  See 
Gage v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 717 F.Supp. 745, 750-51 (D. Kan. 1989); Dart v. Western 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 438 P.2d 407 (Ariz. 1968); ANJ Future Invs., Inc. V. Alter, 756 So.2d 153, 154 
(Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Broecker, 77 N.E. 1092, 1092 (Ind. 1906); 
Hazeltine v. Granger, 7 N.W. 74, 75 (Mich. 1880).  In other states such a clause is helpful but not 
conclusive on the issue.  See Barclays Bank v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 743, 748 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1977); Fleet Bank v. Zimelman, 575 A.2d 731, 734 (Me. 1990); Riverside Properties v. 
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 590 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).  Finally, in a few 
states, such a clause is enforceable by a lender without the necessity for a showing of any of the 
ordinary grounds for the appointment of a receiver.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.17 (West Supp. 
2006); Febbraro v. Febbraro, 416 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
77See First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976). 
78See Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In re Charles D. Stapp of Nevada, Inc.), 641 F.2d 737, 
740 (9th Cir. 1981); Vector Realty Group v. 711 Fourteenth St., Inc., 711 A.2d 1265, 1267 (D.C. 
1998); Hawaii Nat’l Bank v. Cook, 58 P.3d 60, 67 (Hawaii 2002); Metlife Capital Fin. Corp. V. 
Wash. Ave Assocs. L.P., 732 A.2d 493, 503 (N.J. 1999); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 
(Tex. 1981). 
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C. THE RIGHT TO PREVIOUSLY COLLECTED RENTS 
Another problem with the collateral assignment of rents from a lender’s point 
of view is that the lender cannot reach rents collected by the borrower after 
default.  Rents collected by the borrower are severed from the realty, and the 
lender’s interest in rents under a collateral assignment of rents does not extend 
to these personal property “proceeds” of rents.79 An agreement of the parties to 
the contrary is not effective.80 The lender’s inability to reach rents collected by 
the borrower between default and the lender’s exercise of its rights under a 
collateral assignment of rents is particularly troublesome in those states where 
the lender must take some burdensome action in order to begin collecting rents.  
Since the lender may not be able to take possession of the property or obtain the 
appointment of a receiver quickly, the borrower may be able to collect rents for 
several months and misapply those rents without recourse by the lender. 
An absolute assignment of rents on the other hand gives the lender the right to 
rents collected by the borrower or other parties after default.81 Therefore, the 
lender’s inability to reach rents collected by the borrower after default pursuant 
to a collateral assignment of rents gives the lender another incentive to require 
an absolute assignment of rents. 
The absolute assignment of rents is not a recent development.  Borrower, 
lenders, and courts have been struggling with the problems related to 
assignments of rents for many years.  Lenders have attempted to solve these 
problems by using the absolute assignment of rents for over a century. 
III.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT 
OF RENTS 
The use of rents as additional security for a mortgage loan was recognized 
very early in American law.  John Powell acknowledged in his 1807 treatise on 
mortgage law that “rents may be mortgaged.”82 The earliest corporate deed of 
trust found, dated March 29, 1830, had a clause that allowed the trustee, upon 
the occurrence of a default, to enter and take possession of the property and to 
 
79See Park at Dash Point, 121 B.R. at 855.  Even after default, a borrower has the right to collect 
rents until the lender enforces its assignment of rents, and the lender has no rights whatsoever to 
those rents collected by the borrower prior to enforcement.  See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Liberdar 
Holding Corp., 74 F.2d 50, 51 (2nd Cir. 1934); In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855 
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at 
Dash Point L.P.), 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 
B.R. 289, 297 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); Martinez v. Continental Enterprises, 730 P.2d 308, 316 
(Colo. 1986); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981).  But cf. Fed. Land Bank v. Lower, 
421 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1988) (holding that a lender with a valid lien on rents created by chattel 
mortgage was entitled to an accounting from the borrower for rents collected by the borrower 
during the period between entry of a foreclosure decree and request by the lender for appointment 
of a receiver). 
80See, e.g., Glessner v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Glessner), 140 B.R. 556, 561 (Bankr. 
D. Kan. 1992) ("Reason and authority lead us to the conclusion that the mortgagee is not entitled to 
the benefits of the contract for the rents and profits of the land until he has, by appropriate 
proceedings through the courts, taken the possession and control of such rents and profits.") 
(quoting Hall v. Goldsworthy, 14 P.2d 659, 661 (Kan. 1932)); Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank (In 
re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) ("[I]n Montana, a mortgagee may 
secure a security interest in the rents from the mortgaged property only by appointment of a 
receiver, even though . . . the mortgage instrument contains an assignment of rent provision upon 
default."). 
81See FDIC v. Int'l Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d at 1034; In re O'Neill Enterprises, Inc., 
506 F.2d at 1244; In re Ventura-Louise Properties, 490 F.2d at 1145. 
82JOHN J. POWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 25 (1st Am. ed. 1807).  The first 
American edition was adapted from the fourth English edition. 
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collect rents and profits therefrom.83 The problem for early attorneys, as for 
attorneys today, was in drafting the language that would create a security 
interest in rents that could be enforced in accordance with the intent of the 
parties. 
Many early cases acknowledge the right of a mortgage lender pursuant to a 
“pledge” of rents to collect rents after taking possession of the property, 
obtaining the appointment of a receiver, or some similar action.84 More difficult 
to find are early cases recognizing the ability of a lender to collect rents upon 
default without taking possession or some equivalent action.  In many of the 
early cases, the agreement of the parties was that the lender must take possession 
or equivalent action in order to collect rents; therefore, the right of the lender to 
collect rents without taking possession was not at issue.  In other cases, there 
was no assignment of rents, but the granting clause of the mortgage or deed of 
trust covered the real property together with rents and profits.85 In these cases, 
courts properly held that the mortgagor was entitled to the rents until the lender 
took possession or obtained a receiver.  In other cases, however, courts simply 
refused to give effect to the language of the agreement giving the lender the 
right to rents upon default.86 
In some late nineteenth and early twentieth century cases, the parties agreed 
that the lender could collect rents from the outset of the loan with out taking 
possession.87 Typical of these cases is Harris v. Taylor88 decided in 1989 in 
which a first mortgage lender was assigned “the sum of $200 of the rents 
collected for each month.”89 A second lienholder had brought suit for 
foreclosure and appointment of a receiver, and the first lienholder was seeking 
to have rents paid over to him by the receiver.  In holding for the first lienholder, 
the court said that his assignment of rents “purports to be an absolute, primary 
security for the debt, and was so treated prior to the appointment of the 
receiver.”90 The court thus enforced the assignment of rents in accordance with 
the agreement of the parties that the lender could collect rents without taking 
possession of the mortgaged property. 
Although courts gave effect to an agreement of the parties that the lender 
collect rents from the outset, what lenders often wanted was the ability to collect 
rents upon default without taking possession.  Courts were then, as now, 
reluctant to find this type of agreement.  In 1888 in Freedman’s Savings & Trust 
Co. v. Shepherd91 the United States Supreme Court stated: 
 
83See Israels & Kramer, supra note 4, at 488; James G. Smith, A Forgotten Chapter in the Early 
History of the Corporate Trust Deed, 61 AM. L. REV. 900, 904-05 (1927). 
84See Freedman’s Savings & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 502 (1888); In re. Banner, 149 
F. 936, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1907); Sullivan v. Rosson, 19 N.E. 405, 408 (N.Y. 1918). 
85See, e.g., Myers v. Brown, 112 A. 844 (N.J. Ch. 1921). 
86See infra notes 114-122 and accompanying text. 
87See Cargill v. Thompson, 59 N.W. 638 (Minn. 1894); Harris v. Taylor, 54 N.Y.S. 864 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1898).  See also Kelly v. Bowerman, 71 N.W. 836 (Mich. 1897) (involving a mortgagee who, 
through his brother, took possession at the time of execution of the mortgage and holding that an 
“assignment of rents of mortgaged property, to be received by the mortgagee and applied upon the 
mortgage, is valid”); Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. City of Memphis, 290 S.W. 990 (Tenn. 
1927) (requiring borrower, pursuant to trust deed terms, to keep rents on deposit in lender bank for 
application only to operation and maintenance of property and payment of debt). 
8854 N.Y.S. 864 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898). 
89Id. at 866. 
90Id.
91127 U.S. 494 (1888).  Freedman’s Savings was decided long before Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), struck down Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).  Under 
Swift, federal courts were not constrained by state court rulings in deciding issues of “general” 
commercial law because state court decisions were merely evidence of the law, not law themselves.  
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It is, of course, competent for the parties to provide in the mortgage for the 
payment of rents and profits to the mortgagee, even while the mortgagor 
remains in possession.  But when the mortgage contains no such provision, 
and even where the income is expressly pledged as security for the 
mortgage debt, with the right in the mortgagee to take possession upon 
failure of the mortgagor to perform the conditions of the mortgage, the 
general rule is that the mortgagee is not entitled to the rents and profits of 
the mortgaged premises until he takes actual possession, or until possession 
is taken in his behalf by a receiver, . . . or until in proper form, he demands, 
and is refused, possession.92 
Therefore, the court recognized the enforceability of an agreement between the 
parties that the lender collect rents upon default without taking possession long 
before the term “absolute assignment” was used for that purpose.  However, the 
court’s distinction between an interest in rents that can be enforced without 
taking possession and a “pledge of rents” may have contributed to the use of the 
absolute assignment to create an interest in rents that can be enforced without 
possession.  This language from the Freedman’s Savings case has been cited to 
or quoted in over one hundred subsequent cases,93 so the case clearly influenced 
the law governing assignments of rents. 
A few early courts simply gave effect to language in an assignment of rents 
that the lender was entitled to rents upon default.94 For example, in Thomson v. 
Erskine, decided in 1901, a mortgage lender sued a tenant for two months of rent 
that accrued after the borrower’s default and notice by the lender to the tenant.95 
The assignment of rents “by its terms was to become operative upon default.”96 
In holding for the lender, the court stated, “We see no reason why a mortgagor 
may not, if he so desires, agree with his mortgagee, and so stipulate in the bond, 
to assign the rents of the mortgaged property in the event of his default.”97 In 
 
Id. at 18.  Swift was consistent with early nineteenth century ideas that “the common law grew from 
general principles of right and reason that existed independent of judicial decisions, and the 
function of judges was to find, ‘declare,’ and apply the proper ones to each new fact situation.”  
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social 
Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 24 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).  
Under Swift, state court opinions regarding “rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, 
such as the rights and titles to real estate” were laws that federal courts were required to respect.  41 
U.S. at 18.  Although property law was not included as part of the general common law under Swift,
a Supreme Court decision on a property law issue would nevertheless be influential as “evidence of 
the law.”  Based on the number of subsequent opinions that have cited or quoted Freedman’s 
Savings, it clearly was influential.  See infra note 93. 
92Id. at 502. 
93A search conducted on Westlaw in September of 2006 found 114 cases citing Freedman’s 
Savings on the issue of the treatment of rents in a mortgage loan. 
94See State Bank v. Cohen, 123 N.Y.S. 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910); Thomson v. Erskine, 73 N.Y.S. 
166, 166 (N.Y. App. Term 1901); Grannis-Blair Audit Co. v. Maddux, 69 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 
1934); Franzen v. G.R. Kinney Co., 259 N.W. 850 (Wis. 1935).  See also Cullen v. Foote, 61 N.W. 
818 (Minn. 1895) (holding that a mortgage lender was entitle to rent for payment of taxes and 
insurance after default despite a Minnesota statute that prohibited a mortgagee from taking 
possession or collecting rents for other purposes); accord Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. West, 
226 N.W. 406 (Minn. 1929). 
9573 N.Y.S. at 166. 
96Id.
97Id. at 167. 
Several courts followed the decision in Thomson, including State Bank v. Cohen, 123 N.Y.S. 
747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910), Sullivan v. Rosson, 151 N.Y.S. 613, 615 ( N.Y. App. Div. 1915), rev’d 
119 N.E. 405 (N.Y. 1918), and In re Jarmulowsky, 224 F. 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (following Sullivan 
v. Rosson, prior to its reversal, in an opinion written by then District Judge Learned Hand).  
Sullivan v. Rosson, however, was reversed on appeal. 119 N.E. at 408.  See infra notes 114-117 
and accompanying text. 
In a subsequent New York case, an assignment of rents upon default was again enforced 
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Grannis-Blair Audit Co. v. Maddux,98 the court held that the right of a mortgage 
lender not in possession of the property to rents pursuant to an assignment of 
rents clause in the deed of trust was superior to the claim of a garnishor, stating: 
The general rule . . . is that, so long as mortgagors are permitted to remain 
in possession, they are entitled to the rents, but, in view of the explicit 
provision in the trust mortgage before us giving to the trustee the right to 
the rents upon default in the payment of interest or principal of the debt, 
upon making demand therefor, neither entry, nor foreclosure proceedings, 
was a necessary prerequisite, this agreement taking the case out of the 
general rule.99
Most courts in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century would 
not give a lender rents accruing after default until the lender took possession or 
obtained the appointment of a receiver.  Courts sometimes found that was the 
intent of the parties to the assignment of rents.  For example, in One Hundred 
Forty-Eight Realty Co. v. Conrad,100 the assignment of rents provided that “rents 
and profits are hereby, in the event of any default . . . pledged and assigned to 
the party of the second part, . . . with full power and authority to the said party of 
the second part to enter upon and to take possession of the mortgaged 
premises.101 The court found that the clause required the lender to take 
possession in order to collect rents.102 In Simpson v. Ferguson,103 the court 
quoted Jones on Mortgages, stating, “Even if the rents and profits of the 
mortgaged property are expressly pledged for the security of the mortgage debt, 
with the right in the mortgagee to take possession upon default, the mortgagee is 
not entitled to the rents and profits until he takes actual possession, or until 
possession is taken in his behalf by a receiver.”104 Therefore, when the 
assignment of rents itself required the lender to take possession, courts required 
the lender to take possession in order to collect rents.  However, even in cases in 
which the assignment of rents purported to give the lender the right to rents 
upon default, a number of courts required the lender to take possession or obtain 
the appointment of a receiver in order to collect rents on the basis that the parties 
intended a pledge rather than an absolute assignment of the rents.105 
The pledge was one of several common law security devices that were for the 
most part superceded by Article 9 of the UCC.106 The requirements of a 
 
according to its terms.  See Katz v. Goodman, 238 N.Y.S. 700, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929).  In Katz 
a borrower sought to evict a tenant who had paid rent to the mortgage lender after the lender had 
made demand on the borrower for possession.  The court said: “By the provisions of the mortgage, 
the rents were assigned and pledged to the mortgagee after default and the right of entry to collect 
and apply the rents was given.  The mortgagor in equity could not assert his own violation of his 
agreement to prevent its enforcement.”  Id.
9869 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1934). 
99Id. at 238-39.  The California Supreme Court in Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 
discussed infra at notes 131-132, cited Grannis-Blair as being an “absolute assignment of rents” 
case.  See Kinnison, 115 P.2d 450, 453 (Cal. 1941). 
100210 N.Y.S. 400 (N.Y. App. Term. 1925). 
101Id. at 401. 
102Id. at 405. 
10344 P. 484 (Cal. 1896). 
104Id. at 484 (quoting LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 670 (5th ed. 1894))(emphasis added by court). 
105See In re. Banner, 149 F. 936, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1907); Sullivan v. Rosson, 19 N.E. 405, 408 (N.Y. 
1918). 
106See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, §§ 30-1(a), 30-2.  Even after widespread adoption of 
Article 9 of the UCC, the common law pledge continued to be used for certain purposes.  For 
example, lenders continued to take a common law pledge of collateral such as deposit accounts that 
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common law pledge are a debt, an offer of property as security for the debt, and 
delivery of possession of the property from the pledgor to the pledgee.107 The 
possession element is essential in order to make the pledge effective,108 and 
possession must continue in order for the pledge to remain in effect.109 
Possession can be actual or constructive, such as the delivery of a key to a 
warehouse holding the pledged property.110 The possession requirement of the 
common law pledge may be the source of the requirement that a pledge of rents 
is not effective until the lender takes possession of the mortgaged property or 
some similar action.  It may also explain the terminology used by courts that an 
assignment of rents is “inchoate” until the lender takes possession of the 
mortgaged property or some similar action, and thus explain the roots of the 
perfection problem. 
In order to avoid the possession requirement of a “pledge” of rents, lenders 
attempted the “absolute assignment” argument very early.  In Armour Packing 
Company v. Wolff & Company,111 an assignment of rents stated that the 
mortgagor did “hereby transfer, assign and make over” to the lender the rents 
“as additional security for the payment of said notes.”112 The lender in an 
interpleader in a garnishment proceeding claimed rents collected prior to the 
lender’s foreclosure on the basis that the assignment of rents was an absolute 
assignment.  The court held it was not, stating: “Being a mere security for the 
payment of money, the legal incidents to such securities attach.  One of these is 
that, until the mortgagee takes possession, the mortgagor is entitled to the 
rents.”113 In Sullivan v. Rosson,114 rents were “assigned to the holder of this 
mortgage as further security for the payment of said indebtedness.”115 The 
lender claimed that this language made him the “unqualified owner of the rents . 
. . to an amount sufficient to pay said mortgage.”116 The court held that the 
assignment of rents was not an absolute transfer, but a pledge of the rents as 
security for the debt.117 In re Banner118 involved an assignment of rents clause 
in a mortgage that provided, “And the said rents and profits are hereby, in the 
event of any default . . . assigned to the holder of this mortgage.”119 The lender 
argued that assignment clause gave the lender title to the rents upon the 
occurrence of a default.120 The court found that the language created a pledge, 
distinguishing the earlier Harris case121 on the basis that the assignment of rents 
in that case was in a separate document.122 
were not covered by earlier versions of Article 9.  See UCC § 9-104 (l) (1972), (1978).  Article 9 no 
longer excludes deposit accounts from its scope.  See UCC § 9-109 cmt. 16 (2001). 
107Mechanic’s & Traders Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 103 U.S. 352, 356 (1880); Alabama Land & Mineral 
Corp. V. Toffel, 292 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002). 
108See Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 477 (1877); Toffel, 292 F.3d at 1326; Thurber v. Oliver, 26 
F. 224, 227 (C.C.D. Md. 1885). 
109See Casey, 96 U.S. at 477; Thurber, 26 F. At 227. 
110See Casey, 96 U.S. at 477. 
11159 Mo. App. 665 (1894). 
112Id. at 665 (emphasis added by court). 
113Id.
114119 N.E. 405 (N.Y. 1918) 
115Id. at 406. 
116Id. at 407. 
117Id. at 408. 
118149 F. 936, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1907). 
119Id. at 937. 
120Id. at 938. 
121See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
122149 F. at 938-39. 
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Lenders were eventually successful in making the “absolute assignment” 
argument.123 In Paramount Building & Loan Association v. Sacks,124 three 
mortgagees claimed rents collected by a receiver after default and before 
foreclosure by the first lienholder. The first lienholder had an assignment of 
rents that by its terms became effective upon filing a bill to foreclose; the second 
lienholder had an assignment of rents effective upon default; and the third 
lienholder was in possession of the property and collecting rents pursuant to his 
assignment of rents.125 The court held that the second lienholder was entitled to 
rents that accrued after default and before the first lienholder filed a bill of 
foreclosure.  In so holding, the court, citing Freedman’s Saving & Trust 
Company v. Shepard, distinguished between a pledge of the rents that would 
require possession and an assignment of the rents.126 In Stanton v. Metropolitan 
Lumber Co.,127 decided at about the same time as Paramount, another New 
Jersey court held that an assignment of rents gave a mortgage lender the right to 
rents accruing after default.  The court said: “The assignment, though 
conditional, became absolute upon default of the mortgage debt, and was valid 
and enforceable against the assignor . . . .  As the rents accrued after the default, 
the ownership was in the assignee; the title was never in the receiver and he, 
having collected them, is accountable.”128 
Courts could have simply decided to enforce an assignment of rents effective 
upon default in accordance with the intent of the parties.  Instead, courts began 
focusing to a greater extent on whether the assignment was an absolute 
assignment transferring title to the rents.  For example, Justice Augustus Hand 
in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Liberdar Holding Corp.129 distinguished between 
an assignment for security and “a transfer of outright ownership.”130 The 
California Supreme Court in the frequently cited case of Kinnison v. Guaranty 
Liquidating Corp.131 stated, “The agreement between the parties . . . may 
provide that in the event of default the rents are assigned absolutely to the 
mortgagee.  It has been held that such a provision, rather than pledging the rents 
as additional security, operates to transfer to the mortgagee the mortgagor’s right 
to the rentals upon the happening of the specified condition.”132 This distinction 
is probably a result of the language of Justice Harlan’s opinion in Freedman’s 
 
123See Paramount Building & Loan Association v. Sacks, 152 A. 457 (N.J. Ch. 1930); Stanton v. 
Metropolitan Lumber Co., 152 A. 653 (N.J. Eq. 1930); Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 
115 P.2d 450, 453 (Cal. 1941).  Some early cases did not necessarily use the “absolute” assignment 
terminology, but distinguished between a pledge and an assignment. 
124152 A. 457, 457 (N.J. Ch. 1930). 
125Id.
126Id. at 458 (citing Freedman’s, 127 U.S. 494 (1888)). 
127152 A. 653 (N.J. Eq. 1930). 
128Id. at 654-55. 
12974 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1934) 
130Id. at 51.  Justice Hand discussed the policy behind this distinction as follows: 
It seems unlikely that mere words of assignment of future rents can entitle a 
mortgagee to claim rentals which have been collected by a mortgagor and mingled 
with its other property.  Sound policy as well as every probably intention should 
premetn a mortgagee from interfering with the mortgagor’s possession until the 
mortgagee takes steps to get the rentals within his control.  To hold otherwise would 
be to impose unworkable restrictions upon industry in cases where mortgagors have 
been led to suppose that they might rightfully apply the rentals to their own business. 
Id. at 51. 
131115 P.2d 450, 453 (Cal. 1941). 
132Id. at 453.  Kinnison involved an assignment of rents that was executed by the borrower after the 
borrower’s default.  The agreement required that the borrower collect rents for the account of the 
lender.  Id. at 451-52. 
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Savings in which he acknowledged the ability of the parties to agree that the 
lender would be entitled to rents without taking possession, but distinguished 
that agreement from a “pledge” of the rents.133 Regardless of the reasons for its 
development, the movement towards the concept of the absolute assignment of 
rents was unfortunate. 
IV.  CREATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABSOLUTE 
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
A. DEBATING THE EFFECT OF THE ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
A number of courts have stated that an absolute assignment of rents is one 
which transfers “title” or “ownership” of the rents to the lender contingent upon 
some future event such as default.134 These courts treat the absolute assignment 
of rents as a sale of the rental stream rather than as a type of security interest 
because of the form and language of the document.  They are clearly elevating 
form over substance and have been routinely criticized by commentators writing 
on the subject.135 
Other courts have acknowledged that an absolute assignment does in fact 
create a security interest, albeit a different type of security interest from a 
collateral assignment the rents.136 For example, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit recognized that “[t]he concept of a present transfer of title to rents 
contingent upon default, as opposed to a security interest in rents, is essentially a 
legal fiction.”137 An Illinois bankruptcy court made the same point in a more 
humorous manner, stating, “[The lender] can call this arrangement an “absolute 
assignment” or, more appropriately, “Mickey Mouse.”  It’s still a lien . . . .”138 
133See Freedman’s Savings & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 502 (1888), quoted, supra, in 
text accompanying note 92. 
134See, e.g.,Great West Life Assurance Co. v. Rothman (In re Ventura Louise Properties), 490 F.2d 
1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1974) ("by assignment, title is transferred") (quoting Paramount Bldg. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Sacks, 152 A. 457, 458 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1930)); In re Salem Plaza Assocs., 135 
B.R. 753, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (absolute assignment "upon default, divests the [borrower] 
of every interest in the rents"); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981) (absolute 
assignment "passes title to the rents"). 
135See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY–MORTGAGES § 4.2, Reporter’s Note at 214 (1997); 
Averch et al, supra note 4, at 709; Carlson, supra note 4, at 1105-07; Forrester, supra note 1, at 
379-80; Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 4, at 29-35; Randolph, supra note 4, at 290. 
136See, e.g., FDIC v. Int'l Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991); 500 
Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (In re 500 Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd.), 141 B.R. 191, 195-
96 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R. 202, 206 (Bankr. 
D. Md. 1990); Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Center Assocs. (In re Winslow Center 
Assocs.), 50 B.R. 679, 681 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1985); National Operating, L.P. v. Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 630 N.W.2d 116 (Wis. 2001). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the absolute assignment as follows: 
The assignment here is "absolute" in the sense that it was effective upon default 
without further action by the creditor.  . . .  "Absolute" does not mean, however, that 
the assignee is relieved of all obligation to account or that the right to the rents is 
independent of the underlying debt.  Upon foreclosure, the creditor, of course, must 
account for any excess derived from the sale and rents collected between the date of 
default and the date of foreclosure sale over and above the amount of the obligation 
owed. 
In re Charles D. Stapp, 641 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1981). 
137See FDIC v. Int'l Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Randolph, supra note 4, at 290). 
138Foundry of Barrington Partnership v. Barrett (In re Foundry of Barrington Partnership), 129 B.R. 
550 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991). 
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The courts holding that an absolute assignment does in fact create a type of 
security interest are correct because of the true substance of the assignment of 
rents in the context of a mortgage loan.  The substance of the transaction is the 
creation of a security interest for a number of reasons.  First, an absolute 
assignment of rents is given in connection with and only because of the related 
mortgage loan.  Second, the borrower is typically permitted to collect rents prior 
to default.  Although the borrower may be required to apply rents to pay for 
operation and maintenance of the property and to pay debt service, the 
borrower’s use of excess rents is not restricted.  Third, the lender is not entitled 
to collect rents until after a default under the terms of the mortgage loan.  
Fourth, the rents that the lender collects must be applied to the indebtedness or 
for expenses related to the mortgaged property.  The lender cannot use rents to 
give its stockholders a dividend, to give its employees a raise, or to redecorate 
its offices.  Fifth, the borrower retains the risk of nonpayment of rents by the 
tenants.  If a tenant fails to pay rent, the debt is not reduced.  Finally, the 
absolute assignment of rents terminates upon payment in full of the debt.  After 
the debt is paid the “lien” on rents must be released, and the borrower may 
collect them unencumbered by any obligation to the lender.  All of these factors 
point to the fact that the absolute assignment is in fact a security interest. 
Theoretically, a property owner could sell the right to collect rents from the 
property to a mortgage lender.  If the transaction were truly a sale of the rents to 
the lender, the lender would give some consideration for the purchase, such as a 
reduction in the debt by an amount equal to the present value of the future rental 
stream.  Instead, rents collected by a lender are applied to the indebtedness only 
as and to the extent collected.  If the lender purchased the rental stream, the 
lender would begin collecting rents immediately, and the lender would bear the 
risk of non-payment by tenants.  A true sale of the rents would not terminate on 
the final repayment of the indebtedness.139 
Other types of receivables are commonly sold.  The business of factoring 
involves the sale of accounts at a discount to a factor who collects the 
accounts.140 The modern practice of asset securitization involve the “true sale” 
of assets such as mortgage loans, car loans, credit card receivables, or other 
receivables to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that issues securities to 
investors.141 The transfer is structured as a “true sale” in order to remove the 
assets from the originator’s bankruptcy estate.142 
Rents are typically not transferred in a “true sale” because the property 
owner/landlord of necessity retains the landlord’s obligation to perform under 
the leases.  Without the rental stream, a landlord would have little incentive to 
perform the landlord’s duties under the lease.  If the landlord stops performing, 
the tenants are likely to stop paying rent.  Thus, rents are not a particularly 
 
139Although unlikely, it is of course possible that a lender could purchase its borrower's rents, 
reducing the indebtedness by an amount equal to the value of the rental stream and taking the risk 
of collection of the rent and defaults by the tenants.  Such a purchase would probably be of rents 
under specific leases and would terminate when the terms of the assigned leases had expired rather 
than when the borrower's indebtedness to the lender was repaid. 
140See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 30-7.  Traditionally, the factor purchased the accounts 
on a non-recourse basis, meaning that the factor took the entire risk of collecting the accounts.  Id.
Article 9 covers sales of accounts.  U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). 
141See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 30-7, 30-7 n.2.; Steven L Schwarcz, The Alchemy of 
Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135  (1994). 
142See Schwarcz, supra note 141, at 135-36.  Some courts have incorrectly held that an absolute 
assignment of rents removes the right to rents from the borrower’s bankruptcy estate.  See infra 
Part IV.D. 
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desirable “receivable” for a prospective purchaser. 
A mortgage lender on the other hand has every reason to want an assignment 
of rents as an incident to its mortgage, and the lender has an incentive to 
maintain the rental stream and the value of the real property that is security for 
the mortgage loan.  This transfer is not a transfer of title at all but a transfer of a 
security interest.  The superior treatment of the “absolute assignment” type of 
security interest creates the lender’s incentive to couch its security interest in 
terms of an absolute assignment rather than a collateral assignment.  However, 
the confusion over the effect of the absolute assignment has created problems in 
their creation and their treatment. 
B. CREATING AN ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
The uncertainty over whether an absolute assignment of rents creates a 
security interest or transfers title to rents has made them difficult to create.  
Courts have been reluctant in most cases to find that a borrower and lender 
intended an absolute assignment and therefore have required that the intent of 
the parties to create an absolute assignment be very clearly expressed.143 This 
presumption of a collateral assignment of rents is not warranted given the 
sophisticated nature of parties to a commercial real estate loan secured by an 
income-producing property.  Nevertheless, the presumption persists.  Language 
in an assignment of rents that the lender must take some action after default in 
order to collect rents may be fatal to the finding of an absolute assignment.144 
Furthermore, if an assignment of rents provides that it is given “as security” or 
“as additional security” for the mortgage debt, courts will hold that it is not an 
absolute assignment.145 This elevation of form over substance has created a 
drafting nightmare for lenders and their attorneys attempting to secure a loan 
with an absolute assignment that passes title to the rents upon default and is not 
“security” for the loan.  This difficulty has continued for over a century and has 
caused a substantial amount of litigation. 
Armour Packing Co. v. Wolff & Co., decided in 1894, involved a contest 
between a garnishor and a mortgagee over rents collected by the garnishee after 
default in the mortgage and before the foreclosure sale.146 An assignment of 
rents executed after the mortgage provided that the mortgagor did “hereby 
transfer, assign and make over to the said company (the mortgagee) any and all 
 
143See FDIC v. Int'l Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1991); Prudential 
Ins. Co. V. Liberdar Holding Corp., 74 F.2d 50, 51 (1934); In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268 B.R. 140, 
146 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001). 
144See, e.g., In re 1301 Connecticut Ave. Assocs., 117 B.R. 2, 7 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 126 
B.R. 1 (D.D.C. 1991); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Tex. 1981); Cadle Co. v. 
Collin Creek Phase II Assocs., Ltd., 998 S.W.2d 718, 723-24 (Tex. App. 1999). 
145See, e.g., In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268 B.R. 140, 146-47 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001); In re 1301 
Connecticut Ave. Assocs., 117 B.R. 2, 7 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990), aff’d 126 B.R. 1 (D.D.C. 1991); In 
re Ass'n Center Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142, 145 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1988); Taylor v. Brennan, 
621 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Tex. 1981).  But see In re Carretta, 220 B.R. 203 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding 
an absolute assignment despite language in assignment of rents that it was given “as further 
security”); In re Galvin, 120 B.R. 767, 771 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (finding an absolute assignment 
based on intent of the parties despite language in assignment that it was given to secure the debt).  
In FDIC v. International Property Management, Inc., the Fifth Circuit recognized that all 
assignments of rents made in connection with a mortgage loan are undoubtedly made to secure the 
debt, but the court nevertheless stressed the fact that the assignment in that case did not use the 
words "security" or "pledge" in holding that it was an absolute assignment.  929 F.2d 1033, 1038 
(5th Cir. 1991). 
14659 Mo. App. 665 (1894). 
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rents . . . as additional security for the payment of said notes.”147 The 
mortgagee argued that he was entitled to rents because the assignment was an 
absolute assignment.  The court rejected this argument on the basis of the 
“security” language in the assignment, stating, “Being a mere security for the 
payment of money, the legal incidents to such securities attach.  One of these is 
that, until the mortgagee takes possession, the mortgagor is entitled to the 
rents.”148 
Through the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, courts have continued 
to struggle with the same issues.149 In Condor One, Inc. v. Turtle Creek, Ltd. (In 
re Turtle Creek, Ltd.), decided in 1996, an assignment of rents provided “[t]hat 
all rents, profits and income from the property covered by this Mortgage are 
hereby assigned to the Mortgagee for the purpose of discharging the debt hereby 
secured.”150 The lender argued that the assignment of rents was absolute, but 
the court held that it was only intended as security based on the language in the 
document.151 In 2001, a Tennessee bankruptcy court considered an assignment 
of rents that stated, “As part of the consideration for the indebtedness secured 
hereby, Borrower hereby absolutely and unconditionally assigns and transfers 
to Lender and grants to the Lender a security interest in any and all leases . . .
with all the security deposits, rents . . . , issues, profits, revenues and other 
income of the premises . . . .”152 The court concluded based on the “inconsistent 
and contradictory language contained in the deed of trust” and based on a 
“presumption that an assignment operates as security for a debt” that the parties 
intended a pledge rather than an absolute assignment.153 Because of the pretense 
involved in creating an absolute assignment of rents, lenders still struggle with 
these drafting issues, thus incurring additional transaction costs.  Lenders and 
borrowers must still spend money litigating these issues, and courts are using 
scarce judicial resources in hearing these disputes. 
C. STATE LAW CONSEQUENCES OF CONFUSION OVER CHARACTERIZING AN 
ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
Confusion over the characterization of an absolute assignment of rents as a 
transfer of title to rents or a security interest has also been a source of 
unnecessary litigation.  The problems arise because assignments that are in fact 
made for security appear on their face to be transfers of title to rent and because 
courts characterize absolute assignments of rents as passing ownership of the 
rents to the lender.  As a result, lenders may be sued by tenants or other parties 
as if the lender is the owner of the landlord’s reversion.  These problems have 
persisted for over a century. 
A 1894 case, Cargill v. Thompson, involved an assignment of rents that on its 
face was an absolute assignment.154 In Cargill, the borrower executed a deed, 
absolute on its face, conveying several tracts of land to the lender, including “the 
right to receive, collect, and hold all rentals from any and all persons for the use 
 
147Id. at 665 (emphasis added by the court). 
148Id.
149See, e.g., In re. Banner, 149 F. 936, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1907); Sullivan v. Rosson, 19 N.E. 405, 408 
(N.Y. 1918). 
150194 B.R. 267, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996). 
151Id.
152In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268 B.R. 140, 146-47 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001) (emphasis added by 
court). 
153Id. at 147-48 (emphasis in original). 
15459 N.W. 638 (Minn. 1894). 
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of said property.”155 In addition to the deed the parties executed other 
agreements providing for reconveyance upon certain conditions including 
repayment of the debt, providing that the borrower would stay in possession of 
the property, and providing that the lender would collect rents and apply them to 
payment of taxes, insurance, interest on the debt, repairs, and principal on the 
debt with surplus eventually being returned to the borrower.156 The lessees sued 
the lender claiming that the transaction was a conditional sale which put the 
lender in privity with lessees and that the absolute assignment of rents brought 
the lender into privity with lessees, making the lender liable under the lease 
covenants.157 The court concluded that the transaction was a mortgage and that 
an assignment of rents “by way of mortgage” gives the lender a relationship to 
rents “the same as that of the mortgagee of the land towards the legal title, –that 
of one holding a lien . . . .  He is not, therefore, an assignee, so as to be liable on 
the covenants in the lease.”158 
In a similar lawsuit in 1990, a tenant sued a lender for breaches under a lease 
occurring prior to the lender’s foreclosure.159 The tenant claimed that the 
lender’s absolute assignment of rents placed the lender in privity of estate with 
the tenant and therefore made the lender liable for lease covenants.  The court 
did not decide whether the assignment of rents created “only a pledge or an 
absolute assignment.”160 Instead, the court looked to a provision in the 
assignment of rents that the assignee was undertaking no obligation under the 
lease.  Based on that provision, the court held that the lender was not liable.161 
Therefore, the court reached the correct result, but incorrectly implied that a 
finding of an absolute assignment without any special language abrogating 
assignee liability would be relevant in determining whether the lender was 
liable. 
Ten years later, in a suit by a landlord against a tenant for breach of lease, the 
tenant argued that the lender was a necessary party in the suit because of an 
absolute assignment of rents.162 The court looked to the provisions of the 
assignment of rents giving the borrower the right to collect rents until the lender 
gave notice of default.  Because the lender never gave notice of default, the 
court held that the borrower retained the right to bring or defend a suit under the 
lease and, therefore, that the lender was not a necessary party to the suit.163 
Once again, the court reached the right result, but the court incorrectly implied 
that a lender with an absolute assignment of rents could be treated as a party to 
the lease after default under the terms of the mortgage. 
In another recent case, a mechanic’s lien claimant argued that its lien was 
superior to a lender’s mortgage lien because a purported absolute assignment of 
 
155Id. at 638. 
156Id. at 638-39. 
157Id. at 639-40.   The lessees also argued that if the lender were merely a mortgagee, he was liable 
on lease covenants as a mortgagee in possession because he was collecting rents.  The court did not 
decide the issue of whether collecting rents made the lender a mortgagee in possession, but found 
that the lender would not be liable on lease covenants even if he were a mortgagee in possession.  
Id. at 640. 
158Id.
159See Naficy v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 1990 WL 122128 (Tex. App.).  As an 
unreported case, Naficy does not create precedent, but it is useful to illustrate the litigation that can 
result from the use of an absolute assignment of rents. 
160Id. at *6-7. 
161Id.
162See Leon’s Fine Foods v. Merit Investment Partners, Ltd., 2000 WL 1048491 (Tex. App.). 
163Id. *2-3. 
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rents gave the lender an interest in property that made the lender an “owner” 
under the mechanic’s lien statute.164 The court held for the lender based on 
Illinois law that does not recognize an absolute assignment.  The court said that 
an assignment of rents in Illinois grants an equitable lien as security for a 
mortgage.165 Thus, the court implied that finding an absolute assignment of 
rents could have changed the result in the case. 
In these particular cases, the courts reached the correct result–that the lender 
was not liable under lease covenants, was not a necessary party in litigation 
involving a lease, and was not an owner for purposes of a mechanics’ lien 
statute.  However, one has to wonder whether these arguments would have been 
made absent the use of a purported “absolute” assignment of rents.  Although 
reaching the right result, the courts did not always articulate a good reason for 
holding as they did.  In fact, the court in 1894 did a better job of articulating the 
effect of a purported absolute assignment of rents than did the later courts.  
Ultimately, although the absolute assignment of rents has served lenders in 
providing a type of security interest that avoids some of the pitfalls of the 
collateral assignment of rents, it has caused needless litigation and confusion.  
This uncertainty has carried over into bankruptcy cases in which it has caused 
more significant problems. 
D. THE ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS IN BANKRUPTCY 
The confusion over whether an absolute assignment of rents is a transfer of 
title to rents or a security interest has created uncertainty in bankruptcy cases as 
well as under state law.  Federal courts are split on the treatment of an absolute 
assignment of rents when the debtor is in bankruptcy.  Most courts addressing 
the issue in the bankruptcy context have held that an absolute assignment gives a 
lender only a security interest in rents.166 These courts recognize the continuing 
interest of the bankruptcy estate in rents covered by an absolute assignment and 
have held that the rents covered by a duly recorded absolute assignment of rents 
are cash collateral.167 
Some federal courts have treated an absolute assignment of rents as giving the 
lender an absolute ownership interest in rents.168 These courts have held that 
 
164See Ecker & Co. v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 645 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill. App. 1994). 
165Id. at 340. 
166See, e.g., In re Cavros, 262 B.R. 206 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001); In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268 B.R. 
140, 146-47 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001); In re Guardian Realty Group, L.L.C., 205 B.R. 1 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. 1997); In re Lyons, 193 B.R. 637, 644 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); 500 Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd. 
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (In re 500 Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd.), 141 B.R. 191 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); 
Foundry of Barrington Partnership v. Barrett (In re Foundry of Barrington Partnership), 129 B.R. 
550 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Rollingwood Apartments, Ltd., 133 B.R. 906 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1991); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R. 202 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).  See also 
FDIC v. Int'l Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Princeton 
Overlook Joint Venture, 143 B.R. 625, 633 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992); Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Winslow Center Assocs. (In re Winslow Center Assocs.), 50 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 
1985). 
167See Rollingwood, 133 B.R. at 913; Princeton Overlook, 143 B.R. at 633; Bethesda, 117 B.R. at 
211. 
168See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank v. Jason Realty, L.P. (In re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423 (3d 
Cir.1995); First Fidelity Bank v. Eleven Hundred Metroplex Assocs., 190 B.R. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995); MacArthur Executive Assocs. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 190 B.R. 189 (D.N.J. 1995); In re 
Kingsport Ventures, L.P., 251 B.R. 841 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000); In re Robin Associates, 275 
B.R. 218 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); In re Carretta, 220 B.R. 203 (D.N.J. 1998); In re Turtle Creek, 
194 B.R. 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); In re Carter, 126 B.R. 811 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re 
Galvin, 120 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990); In re Gould, 78 B.R. 590 (D. Idaho 1987); In re Fry 
Road Assocs., 64 B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986); In re P.M.G. Properties, 55 B.R. 864 (E.D. 
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because the lender owns the rents absolutely as a matter of state law, the 
bankruptcy estate has no interest in the rents.169 Therefore, the bankruptcy 
trustee or debtor in possession has not right to use the rents to operate and 
maintain the property in a reorganization. 
Similar to decisions under state law as to the character of an absolute 
assignment of rents, bankruptcy courts holding that an absolute assignment of 
rents gives a lender ownership of rents rather than a security interest are simply 
incorrect.  Although the form of the transaction may indicate a transfer of title to 
rents, the substance is a security interest.  Some of these courts are following 
state law precedent on the theory that property rights are a matter of state law.170 
They should, however, “look to the substance of state law rights, not merely the 
label that state law places on them.”171
The better reasoned bankruptcy opinions look to the substance of the 
transaction and to factors such as the borrower’s right to collect rents until 
default, the lender’s obligation to apply rents to payment of the debt, and the 
termination of the assignment of rents upon payment of hte loan in full.172 If the 
borrower has any remaining property rights in the rental stream under state law, 
then bankruptcy law dictates that the rental stream be treated as part of the 
bankruptcy estate.173 
When a court holds that rents covered by an absolute assignment are owned 
by the lender, the debtor in possession does not have the rents available for 
operation and maintenance of the mortgaged property as would be the case if 
rents were treated as cash collateral.174 If rents are unavailable for operation and 
maintenance of the property, almost no hope of reorganization exists for a 
borrower in Chapter 11.175 If the debtor has no equity in the property and there 
is not “a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a 
reasonable time,”176 the lender is entitled to relief from the automatic stay.177 
Therefore, the borrower’s efforts to reorganize under the protection of Chapter 
11 will be frustrated even in those cases where a reorganization might otherwise 
 
Mich. 1985). 
169See In re Carter, 126 B.R. at 813; In re Galvin, 120 B.R. at 772; In re Fry Road Assocs., 64 B.R. 
at 809; In re P.M.G. Properties, 55 B.R. at 870. 
170See First Fidelity Bank v. Jason Realty, L.P. (In re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423, 427 (3d 
Cir.1995) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)). 
171See In re Guardian Realty Group, L.L.C., 205 B.R. at 4 (citing United States v. National Bank of 
Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 727 (1985)). 
172See Guardian, 205 B.R. at 4-5, 500 Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (In re 500 
Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd.), 141 B.R. 191, 195 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. 
Partnership, 117 B.R. 202, 206-08 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990); Bryn Athyn Investors, Ltd. v. 
Hutton/Conam Realty Pension Investors (In re Bryn Athyn Investors, Ltd.), 69 B.R. 452, 457 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987). 
173See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2004); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 208-09 (1983). 
174If rents are cash collateral, the debtor in possession may not use the rents without consent of the 
lender or authorization of the bankruptcy court.  See 11 U.S.C. 363(c)(2).  A bankruptcy court may 
not authorize the use of cash collateral by the debtor unless the secured lender is adequately 
protected.  See id. § 363(e).  Bankruptcy courts generally permit the debor to use rents for operation 
and maintenance of the mortgaged property because that use preserves the value of the property 
and, thus, provides the lender adequate protection.  See Forrester, supra note 1, at 387-88. 
175See Craig A. Averch, Revisitation of the Fifth Circuit Opinions of Village Properties and 
Casbeer: Is Post-Petition “Perfection” of an Assignment of Rents Necessary to Characterize 
Rental Income as Cash Collateral?, 93 COMM. L.J. 516, 519 (1988); Carlson, supra note 4, at 
1109.  In a single asset bankruptcy the borrower will have no income available to continue 
operation and maintenance of the mortgaged property. 
176United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 376 (1988). 
17711 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (2004). 
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have been successful.178 This result defeats the policies behind the Bankruptcy 
Code and Chapter 11 and can only be classified as an injustice. 
E. ANALOGOUS “ABSOLUTE” TRANSFERS FOR SECURITY 
Many types of transactions create in substance a security interest but take on 
another form.  Courts interpret these various transactions regularly and are 
accustomed to considering substance over form.  Some examples include the 
mortgage in a title theory state, the absolute deed of real property given as 
security for a loan, and certain sale leaseback transactions involving equipment 
and other personal property.  These analogous situations are valuable tools for 
use in analyzing the treatment of assignments of rents. 
In title theory states, a mortgage is treated as a conveyance that gives title to 
the lender.  However, when faced with determining the substance of the 
transaction, courts acknowledge that the mortgagor “is the equitable owner of 
the property and thus its real owner” during the term of the mortgage.179 
Therefore, a mortgagor could not escape a conviction for violation of building 
ordinances on the ground that the mortgagee had legal title to the property,180
and a mortgagee could not escape the payment of transfer taxes upon purchase 
at foreclosure sale on the basis that it already had legal title to the property.181 
The Rhode Island supreme court called the title theory “a fiction designed to aid 
in decision making . . . not an absolute per se rule of law.”182 Therefore, courts 
have been able to focus on the substance of the mortgage transaction when 
necessary. 
Even in states that do not follow the title theory of mortgages, the parties to a 
mortgage loan transaction may document that transaction as a sale of the 
property rather than a mortgage.  Under some circumstances, usually involving 
an unsophisticated borrower in desperate need of credit, the borrower will give a 
lender an absolute deed to property to secure a loan.  The parties have typically 
agreed that the lender will return the deed unrecorded upon repayment of the 
debt.  In determining the substance of the transaction, courts look at a number of 
factors including the existence of a debt, whether the grantor retained possession 
of the property, a disparity between the value of the property and the 
consideration, and whether there is an agreement for a reconveyance.183 Courts 
permit the introduction of parol evidence to prove the true nature of the 
transaction.184 If a court determines that the substance of such a transaction is in 
fact a mortgage rather than a transfer of title, the court will treat the deed as a 
mortgage on the property.  Therefore, in the context of the absolute deed 
intended as security, courts have been able to look beyond the form of the 
transaction to determine its substance. 
 
178If lender is treated as the owner of rents under an absolute assignment of rents, rents are not 
available for operation and maintenance of the property, and the lender is likely to be granted relief 
from the stay and thus be permitted to foreclose.  See First Fidelity Bank v. Jason Realty, L.P. (In 
re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423, 430 (3d Cir.1995); In re Fry Road Assocs., 66 B.R. 602 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986). 
179State v. Stonybrook, 181 A.2d 601, 604 (Conn. 1962). 
180Id. at 604-05. 
181Block Island Land Trust v. Washington Trust Co., 713 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1998). 
182Id. at 201. 
183See Flack v. McClure, 565 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Ill. App. 1990); Johnson v. Cherry, 726 S.W.2d 4, 7 
(Tex. 1987); Sannerud v. Brantz, 928 P.2d 477, 481 (Wyo. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY–MORTGAGES § 3.2, 3.3 (1997); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 3.8. 
184See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 18, § 3.6. 
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With regard to personal property secured transactions, the scope provision of 
Article 9 of the UCC provides that it applies to “a transaction, regardless of its 
form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by 
contract.”185 The purpose of this provision is to look at the substance of a 
transaction rather than its form.186 Therefore, courts are often called upon to 
determine whether a transaction is a true lease or an installment sale with the 
“lessor” retaining a security interest securing the obligation of the “lessee” to 
purchase goods.187 
Courts must also distinguish in some cases between a true sale of personal 
property and a transfer which creates a security interest.  Although Article 9 
covers sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory 
notes,188 a true sale receives different treatment under Article 9 and must, 
therefore, be distinguished from a transaction that creates a security interest.  
Sales of these intangibles are covered by Article 9 for purposes of perfection.  If 
the purchaser fails to perfect its interest, the seller retains the power to transfer 
good title to a subsequent purchaser,189 just as with real property recording acts.  
At the same time, however, the seller “does not retain a legal or equitable 
interest in the collateral sold.”190 Sales of these intangibles have raised some of 
the same issues in bankruptcy that absolute assignments of rents have raised.191 
If a transfer is a true sale, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession has no 
interest in the property transferred, but if the transfer is of a security interest 
only, the bankruptcy estate retains an interest in the collateral.  Courts seem to 
have more successfully navigated these issues, however, than issues relating to 
absolute assignments of rents. 
V.  SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
The absolute assignment of rents is not a satisfactory method of creating a 
security interest in rents.  It causes problems for lenders in drafting and 
enforcing the assignment of rents.  It causes injustice for borrowers in 
bankruptcy.  It causes unnecessary litigation that in all likelihood raises the cost 
of credit.  It is, nevertheless, the best alternative for lenders at this time.  The 
absolute assignment of rents cannot simply be eliminated unless a workable 
solution to the problems it solves is put in its place.  Therefore, comprehensive 
change is necessary.  This change has occurred gradually in some states through 
the judicial process, but a faster and more comprehensive solution is legislative. 
A. THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION 
The Restatement (Third) of Property–Mortgages provides a workable system 
for lenders to take a security interest in rents, making the absolute assignment is 
unnecessary.192 The Restatement takes the position that “[t]he use of ‘absolute 
 
185UCC § 9-109 (a)(1).  In addition, Article 9 applies to some transactions that are not intended to 
create a security interest including “a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangible, or 
promissory notes” and “a consignment.”  Id. § 9-109(a)(3), (4). 
186See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 30-2. 
187See id. § 30-3. 
188UCC § 9-109 (a)(3). 
189UCC § 9-318(b). 
190Id. § 9-318(a). 
191See, e.g., Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 993 (1993); In re LTV Steel, Inc., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
192RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY–MORTGAGES § 4.2 (1997). 
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assignment’ terminology . . . creates needless confusion and is rejected.”193 In 
fact, the Restatement uses the terminology that rents are “mortgaged” rather than 
assigned to avoid the confusion that the absolute assignment doctrine has 
engendered.194 
Because the Restatement resolves the problems lenders have encountered 
with the collateral assignment of rents, lenders would not need the absolute 
assignment of rents under the Restatement regime.  First, the Restatement 
provides that a mortgage of rents “is effective as against the mortgagor and, 
subject of the operation of the recording act, as against third parties, upon 
execution and delivery.”195 Therefore, a recorded mortgage of rents would have 
priority over a creditor garnishing rents and would not be subject to avoidance 
by a trustee in bankruptcy.  Second, the Restatement provides that a mortgage 
may entitle the lender to collect rents upon default and is enforced by “delivery 
of a demand for the rents to the mortgagor.”196 Therefore, a lender is not 
required to take any burdensome action such as taking possession or obtaining 
the appointment of a receiver in order to enforce the assignment of rents.  A 
lender would not be entitled to rents that the mortgagor collected after default 
and before the demand is made, but lenders can easily make demand after 
default in order to capture rents that accrue after default.  Therefore, the 
Restatement resolves the perfection problem and the enforcement problem that 
lenders have face with collateral assignments of rents.  With a workable scheme 
for mortgaging rents, the absolute assignment of rents becomes unnecessary. 
B. THE UNIFORM ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT 
The new Uniform Assignment of Rents Act (UARA) provides an even better 
solution to the problems caused by the absolute assignment of rents.  The 
UARA is more comprehensive in scope then the Restatement, and it can be 
adopted as a package by state legislatures rather than in a piecemeal fashion by 
the courts. 
The UARA provides that an assignment of rents, including an assignment 
absolute in form, creates a security interest regardless of its form.197 Therefore, 
an absolute assignment of rents made in connection with a mortgage loan would 
be treated the same as any assignment of rents under the Act.198 In addition, 
because the UARA provides for a workable security interest in rents for 
mortgage lenders with due regard for the concerns of borrowers and tenants, it 
eliminates the need for an absolute assignment of rents. 
 
193Id. § 4.2 reporter’s note p. 214. 
194Id. § 4.2 cmt. b. 
195Id. § 4.2 (b). 
196Id. § 4.2 (c)(2).  In addition to the demand, the lender must satisfy any additional conditions 
imposed by the mortgage, id. § 4.2(c)(1), and the demand must also be delivered to the owner of 
the property and other lienholders, id. § 4.2(c)(2). 
197Id. § 4(b). 
198The comments to section 4 provide: 
Nothing in the Act precludes an owner of real property from making a truly absolute 
transfer of rents in a transaction that is not a security transaction, such as a “true 
sale” of rents (in which the owner of the real property transfers full legal, equitable 
ownership and control of unaccrued rents immediately upon execution and delivery).  
Such a transfer, however, is not an “assignment of rents” as defined I the Act (unless 
applicable state law dictates otherwise), and thus the provisions of the Act governing 
the enforcement of an assignment of rents would not apply to such a transfer. 
Id. § 4 cmt. 3. 
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The UARA resolves the problems that lenders have encountered with 
collateral assignments of rents.  First, the Act provides that an assignment of 
rent is fully perfected upon recordation.199 The Act further provides that a 
perfected security interest in rents has priority against a judicial lien creditor or a 
purchaser of the rents or the real property.200 With state law made clear by the 
Act, a recorded assignment of rents would be treated as perfected in bankruptcy, 
resolving that issue once and for all.  Therefore, the Act resolves the perfection 
problem that lenders have used the absolute assignment to avoid. 
Second, the UARA provides detailed provisions relating to the enforcement 
of an assignment of rents.  Under the Act, an assignment of rents may be 
enforced by obtaining the appointment of a receiver,201 by sending notice to the 
mortgagor,202 by sending notice to the tenants,203 or by any other method 
permitted under the particular state’s law.204 Therefore, a lender is not required 
to take any burdensome action in order to enforce the assignment of rents.  The 
lender is entitled to collect from tenants those rents that accrue on or after the 
date of enforcement or that previously accrued but remain unpaid on the date of 
enforcement.205 
The Act makes the borrower personally liable for collecting rents that the 
lender is entitled to collect and provides for attorneys’ fees and costs if the 
borrower fails to turn over collected rents.206 This provision is particularly 
important for lender if the borrower does not have personal liability on the debt 
because the debt is non-recourse or because the mortgaged property has been 
conveyed to a non-assuming grantee.207 Although most courts hold that the 
borrower’s misapplication of rents is waste,208 the Act makes clear the liability 
of the borrower who wrongfully collects rents. 
Third, the UARA addresses the issue of the lender’s security interest in 
proceeds of rents collected by the borrower before or after the mortgage lender 
enforces its assignment of rents.  The Act makes clear that the mortgage lender 
has a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds of rents and that the security 
interest in proceeds is perfected if the security interest in rents is perfected.209 
The Act deals with priority issues relating to cash proceeds in the same manner 
as Article 9 of the UCC.  Therefore, the Act provides a comprehensive scheme 
for the enforcement of an assignment of rents. 
The UARA goes much further to clarify and define the rights and duties of 
the parties to an assignment of rents and to resolve in advance the issues that the 
parties and tenants affected by an assignment of rents might need to litigate.  
First, the Act provides that the enforcement of an assignment of rents does not 
 
199Id. § 5(b). 
200Id. § 5(c). 
201Id. § 7.  This provision also lays out the requirements for a lender to obtain the appointment of a 
receiver.  Id.
202Id. § 8.  The notice must also be sent to the holders of other recorded assignments of rents.  Id. §
8(a). 
203Id. § 9. 
204Id. § 6(a). 
205Id. § 6(b). 
206Id. § 14(b), (d). 
207A grantee of mortgaged property not personally liable on the debt should nevertheless by liable 
for misapplying rents. 
208See Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981); Ginsberg v. Lennar Florida Holdings, 645 
So.2d 490 (Fla. App. 1994); UARA § 14 cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY–
MORTGAGES § 4.6 (a)(5) (1997). 
209UARA §15(b).  “[C]ash proceeds are identifiable if the are maintained in a segregated account or 
. . . to the extent the assignee can identify them by a method of tracing . . . .”  Id. §14(c). 
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“make the assignee a mortgagee in possession of the real property.”210 A few 
courts have found that a lender collecting rents pursuant to an assignment of 
rents is a mortgagee in possession with the attendant liabilities.211 Lenders tend 
to avoid taking possession of mortgaged property prior to foreclosure to avoid 
these liabilities, and, therefore, lenders do not want the liability of a mortgagee 
in possession to arise simply because they are collecting rent.  The UARA 
resolves this issue by providing that the lender does not become a mortgagee in 
possession simply by virtue of collecting rents.  The Act provides further that 
the lender is not obligated by virtue of collecting rents to pay “expenses of 
protecting or maintaining the real property.”212 The assumption is that mortgage 
lenders have sufficient incentive to pay taxes and insurance premiums and to 
maintain the mortgaged property if the borrower is unable or unwilling to do 
so.213 The Act makes clear that if the lender’s failure to maintain the property 
results in a breach of the lease by the landlord, tenants may have a defense to 
paying rent.214 Furthermore, tenants may be entitled to the appointment of a 
receiver to protect and maintain the property.215 So the concerns of tenants as 
well as borrowers and lenders are considered in the Act. 
The Act addresses other concerns that tenants have relating to the 
enforcement of an assignment of rents.  Tenants receiving notice to begin paying 
rent to a lender rather than to the landlord are understandably reluctant to do so 
because of the risk that they may pay the wrong party.  Tenants in this position 
often stop paying rent altogether to avoid paying the wrong party.  The Act 
provides detailed provisions that strongly encourage tenants to pay an assignee 
who has exercised its rights under an assignment of rents rather than the 
landlord and at the same protect the tenants in paying the assignee.216 In 
addition, tenants are given a grace period for payment of rent after receiving a 
notice during which time the tenant may seek the advice of counsel.217 These 
provisions of the Act should make tenants more likely to pay rent to a lender 
who has enforced an assignment of rents and at the same time alleviate tenants’ 
concerns about making the payments. 
The Act considers and balances the rights of borrowers, lenders, and tenants.  
It would eliminate the need for absolute assignments of rents by creating a 
workable security interest for lenders.  It would therefore reduce transaction 
costs and litigation caused by this device.  The Act would resolve confusion 
over the perfection of an assignment of rents.  In addition, under the Act, lenders 
could enforce an assignment of rents upon default simply by sending notice to 
the borrower or tenants.  For borrowers, this method of enforcement is no more 
onerous than rights that lenders have under current law to enforce an absolute 
assignment of rents.  In addition, for the benefit of borrowers, an absolute 
assignment of rents could no longer be used by lenders to block a borrower’s 
ability to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Furthermore, 
the Act addresses tenant’s concerns.  Overall, the Act provides a clear and 
comprehensive scheme for the creation of security interests in rents. 
 
210Id. § 11 (1). 
211See supra note 74. 
212UARA § 13(a). 
213See Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 4, at 56. 
214UARA §13(b). 
215Id. §13(c). 
216Id. § 9(c)-(d). 
217Id. § 9(d), cmt. 5. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The law regarding assignments of rents has been in great disarray for over a 
century.  Lenders, dissatisfied with the problems they have encountered with 
collateral assignments of rents in many states, have turned to the absolute 
assignment of rents as a solution.  The absolute assignment, however, has 
caused even more confusion.  Courts have made drafting an absolute assignment 
difficult to accomplish by requiring the pretense of a transfer of title to the rents.  
Courts have caused additional uncertainty by treating absolute assignments as a 
transfer of title to rents when in fact they simply create a different type of 
security interest.  The refusal of courts to give lenders a reasonable security 
interest under a collateral assignment and lenders’ use of absolute assignments 
to overcome the deficiencies of the collateral assignment have led to additional 
transaction costs and unnecessary litigation. 
A solution to the century-old problems relating to assignments of rents in 
mortgage loan transactions is now at hand.  The new Uniform Assignment of 
Rents Act provides a comprehensive and logical scheme for creating security 
interests in rents that will satisfy mortgage lenders while considering the needs 
of borrowers and tenants.  State legislatures should consider and adopt this Act. 
